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ABSTRACT 
 
Do More Transparent Corporate Actions Following a Restatement Influence the SEC’s 
Decision to Issue an Enforcement Action? (August 2009) 
Rebecca Lynn Files, B.B.A.; M.S., Texas A&M University  
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Edward P. Swanson 
 
 This study examines whether corporate transparency about a restatement 
influences the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) decision to issue an 
enforcement action. I consider corporate transparency to be higher when firms initiate an 
independent investigation into the restatement, display the restatement in a more 
prominent press release location, and/or report the restatement in a more visible SEC 
filing (i.e., Form 8-K).  My sample of restatement observations spans nine years, 1997-
2005, and is taken from the databases compiled by the General Accounting Office. 
For each restatement observation, I hand-collect information on SEC enforcement 
actions from the SEC’s website and information on corporate transparency from  
company press releases and SEC filings.  In order to determine the influence of 
corporate transparency, I develop a model predicting which restatement firms will be 
sanctioned by the SEC that includes measures of restatement severity, restatement 
characteristics, firm characteristics, and all three measures of corporate transparency.   
I find that, on average, greater restatement transparency increases the likelihood 
of an SEC sanction. This result is strongest before the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
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(SOX), where all three proxies for corporate transparency are positive and significant 
predictors of SEC enforcement actions.  After SOX, however, more visible SEC filings 
decrease the likelihood of an SEC sanction, suggesting that the SEC rewards this type of 
transparent behavior.  In addition, the SEC also rewards corporate transparency by 
reducing monetary penalties when an enforcement action is issued.   These results 
extend prior research (Bowen et al. 2005; Files et al. 2008; Gordon et al. 2008; Myers et 
al. 2008) by providing the first evidence on how corporate transparency affects the 
SEC’s decision to issue an enforcement action.  The results may be useful to managers 
of restating firms and academics researching SEC enforcement actions.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) faces the daunting task of 
penalizing and deterring financial misconduct across all publicly traded firms.  This task 
has become exceedingly more difficult in the past decade as the number of firms 
announcing earnings restatements has dramatically increased (Scholz 2008).  Each 
restatement represents a case of potential fraud that could lead to the formal issuance of 
an SEC enforcement action.1  However, the SEC, by its own admission, lacks sufficient 
resources to investigate every case of potential fraud.  Accordingly, only a small 
percentage of restatement firms (generally less than 20%) are officially sanctioned by 
the SEC (Kedia and Rajgopal 2007; Gordon et al. 2008; Peterson 2008).   
This study examines the factors that determine which restatement firms will 
receive an SEC enforcement action.  Specifically, I explore whether corporate 
transparency about a restatement influences the SEC’s choice to sanction a firm.  I 
define corporate transparency as those actions taken by a firm that allow restatement 
information to be more easily extracted and used by the SEC.  While an emerging 
literature suggests that the transparency of restatement information can influence the 
decisions of investors and litigants (Files et al. 2008; Gordon et al. 2008; Myers et al.  
                                                 
This dissertation follows the style of The Accounting Review. 
 
1 SEC enforcement actions represent the formal summaries of events following an investigation by the 
SEC and can take the form of either an Administrative Proceeding or Litigation Release.  Each 
enforcement action summarizes the events leading to the sanction and the punishments against the 
respondents.  The SEC publicly discloses information on enforcement actions on their website 
(www.sec.gov); however, they do not disclose information on investigations not resulting in enforcement 
actions.  Note that I use the words SEC enforcement action and SEC sanction interchangeably throughout 
the text.     
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2008), prior research has not examined the effect of these choices on the SEC’s decision 
to sanction a firm.  This is an important question as SEC sanctions are costly to the firm 
(monetary penalties), management (job loss), auditors (sanctions and lost reputation), 
and investors (stock price declines) (Feroz et al. 1991; Karpoff et al. 2008a,b). 
Therefore, determining whether corporate transparency influences the likelihood of an 
enforcement action is of interest to these parties as they evaluate the possible 
consequences of a restatement.     
I measure corporate transparency in three ways.  First, I consider corporate 
transparency to be higher for those firms that voluntarily initiate an independent 
investigation of the accounting misstatement.2  These investigations are usually 
performed by outside forensic firms or legal counsel and the information they generate 
may be passed on to the SEC.  My second measure of corporate transparency reflects a 
manager’s decision on where to place restatement information within a press release. I 
consider information disclosed in the headline of a press release to have high 
transparency.  Information excluded from the headline, but discussed in the text of the 
press release is considered medium transparency, and information mentioned in the 
footnotes of the press release is considered low transparency.  My third and final 
measure of corporate transparency is the type of SEC filing used to disclose the 
restatement.   I develop this measure using an index that captures four SEC filing 
choices available to a company when disclosing its restatement: (1) a Form 8-K, (2) an 
amended periodic filing, (3) a periodic filing that does not indicate an amendment, and 
                                                 
2 A ―misstatement‖ refers to the incorrect financial report(s) in prior periods, while a ―restatement‖ 
represents the subsequently disclosed and corrected financial statements.   
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(4) no SEC filing.  Similar to Myers et al. (2008), I consider information reported on a 
Form 8-K to be the most transparent, with transparency decreasing respectively across 
the above options. 
I hypothesize that corporate transparency could affect SEC enforcement 
decisions in several different ways.   First, more transparent disclosures reduce agency 
costs by limiting information asymmetry between the firm and outside parties—in this 
case the SEC, and by lowering the cost of monitoring (Diamond and Verrecchia 1991; 
Leuz and Verrecchia 2000; Core 2001; Healy and Palepu 2001).  The SEC, faced with 
time and monetary constraints, may choose to target firms with more transparent 
disclosures to limit their information generating costs.  This suggests a positive 
association between corporate transparency and SEC enforcement actions.  Second, SEC 
employees often rely on external cues, including news reports and company press 
releases, to determine which restatement merits additional scrutiny (Feroz et al. 1991; 
DeFond et al. 2008).  This practice suggests that transparent disclosures are more likely 
to come to the attention of the SEC and are, therefore, more likely to result in a sanction. 
This also indicates a positive association between corporate transparency and SEC 
enforcement actions.  On the other hand, anecdotal evidence suggests that the SEC looks 
favorably upon more transparent voluntary actions taken by the firm following their 
restatement (Young 2002; Foley & Lardner LLP 2005; Hennes et al. 2008).   If the SEC 
believes the company is being fully transparent about its restatement and is making 
efforts to fix the issue internally, the SEC may be more lenient when it comes to filing a 
formal complaint against the company.  This suggests a negative association between 
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corporate transparency and SEC enforcement actions.   Finally, transparency may have 
no effect on the SEC if it chooses targets based solely on the merits of the case rather 
than on actions taken by the restating company.  To address these alternative predictions, 
I develop a model that predicts SEC sanctions following a restatement and then assess 
the incremental impact of corporate transparency.  
For my analyses, I collect a sample of 1,249 restatements that were announced in 
a press release during the 1997-2005 time period. I hand-collect information on 
subsequent SEC enforcement actions and find that 10 percent (119) of the restatements 
end with a formal sanction by the SEC against the firm, its managers, or both.3 The small 
percentage of firms in my sample that receive an SEC sanction is consistent with prior 
research (Burns and Kedia 2006; Kedia and Rajgopal 2007; Gordon et al. 2008; Peterson 
2008) and the notion that the SEC has limited resources.   
In a logistic regression predicting SEC enforcement actions, I include all three 
proxies for corporate transparency along with measures of restatement severity and other 
firm and restatement characteristics.4  I find that, on average, increased corporate 
transparency about a restatement increases the likelihood of an SEC enforcement action.  
Specifically, initiating an independent investigation and announcing the restatement in 
the headline of a press release (instead of the text) increases the odds of an SEC sanction 
by 344 percent and 68 percent, respectively.  The type of SEC filing used by the firm 
                                                 
3 I consider an enforcement action to exist if the SEC issues a sanction against the firm in question, its 
managers, or both.  For ease of exposition, I do not distinguish between the type of respondent in the text 
of the paper, but consider this issue in sensitivity tests. 
4 The inclusion of severity controls is important because the SEC may target more transparent restatements 
if they believe the increased transparency reflects the severity of the restatement.  Therefore, I include five 
measures of restatement severity to control for this alternative explanation. 
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(e.g., Form 8-K, 10-K/A, etc.) is insignificant in a model including all sample years.  
These results suggest that the SEC targets more transparent restatements because they 
attract SEC employees’ attention and/or because they limit the information-generating 
costs of the SEC.   
I further explore these findings by examining the likelihood of enforcement 
actions before and after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX).  SOX influenced the 
SEC in several ways and initiated changes that may have altered the impact of corporate 
transparency on its enforcement decisions.  For example, Congress doubled the SEC’s 
budget from 2002 through 2005. This budget increase resulted in the hiring of over 
1,000 new employees, enabling the SEC to investigate and sanction more cases (SEC 
2004a, 2005).  In conjunction with the staff increase, SOX also mandated that the SEC 
review the financial disclosures of every public company at least once every three years.  
This requirement undoubtedly improved the chances of SEC staff identifying violations 
that may have otherwise remained undiscovered, possibly due to less transparent 
disclosure of the restatement.  Due to these changes, I hypothesize that the impact of 
corporate transparency on SEC sanctions will be altered in the post-SOX time period.    
I find that in the pre-SOX period (1997-2002) all three measures of restatement 
transparency are positive and significant predictors of SEC enforcement actions. This 
suggests that, prior to the changes initiated by SOX, the SEC was more likely to sanction 
restatements disclosed in a transparent manner.   I find several noteworthy changes, 
however, in the post-SOX period (2003-2005).  Press release prominence loses its 
significance in the model, suggesting that restatements are no longer sanctioned because 
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headline disclosure attracts the attention of SEC staff.  Also, the use of more transparent 
SEC filings now lessens the likelihood of receiving an SEC enforcement action. This 
evidence suggests that more transparent SEC filings are rewarded by the SEC in the 
post-SOX period.5   The existence and disclosure of company-initiated independent 
investigations, however, still increases the likelihood of an SEC sanction in the post-
SOX era.  This finding contradicts the conventional wisdom that independent 
investigations will limit SEC involvement after a misstatement (Foley & Lardner LLP 
2005).   
To provide a more complete picture of the SEC’s response to corporate 
transparency, I also explore whether the SEC rewards transparency by reducing the 
penalties associated with a given enforcement action. I find that monetary penalties are 
significantly lower when an independent investigation is initiated.  This result suggests 
that, although the likelihood of an SEC enforcement action is greater when an 
independent investigation is undertaken by the restating firm, the SEC rewards this 
cooperative behavior with smaller monetary penalties.  Additionally, I find that 
individuals pay significantly smaller fines when the restatement is disclosed on a Form 
8-K, providing additional evidence that using transparent SEC filings is rewarded by the 
SEC.   
                                                 
5 Stated differently, firms not disclosing their restatement in a Form 8-K are more likely to be sanctioned 
by the SEC.  This finding may be influenced by the ―Final Rule on 8-K Disclosure Requirements‖ (SEC 
2004b), which was issued in 2004 and mandates that any ―non-reliance on past financial statements‖ (i.e., 
restatements) be reported on a Form 8-K (Item 4.02).  Despite the new rule, 16 percent all restating 
companies in my sample failed to make an 8-K filing after 2004, perhaps leading to the SEC’s deliberate 
focus on these firms.   
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This study contributes to the extant literature in several ways. First, I extend prior 
research examining disclosure transparency and its influence on external parties (Maines 
and McDaniel 2000; Bowen et al. 2005; Files et al. 2008; Myers et al. 2008; Gordon et 
al. 2008). I also develop a model predicting which restatement firms are more likely to 
become targets of the SEC. The findings of this model provide information to managers 
about how the transparency of their actions can influence the likelihood of an SEC 
sanction. The findings may also interest academics doing research involving SEC 
enforcement actions or AAERs, as they shed light on the characteristics that make a firm 
more likely to be included in these samples. For example, I find that revenue 
misstatements are more likely than other types of accounting issues to be sanctioned by 
the SEC. Thus, the SEC’s selection criterion inflates the percentage of revenue 
misstatements in AAER samples relative to the overall number of firms misstating 
revenue (e.g., 53 percent in Dechow et al.’s (2008) AAER sample versus 20 percent in 
Scholz’s (2008) restatement sample). Finally, I present preliminary evidence on the 
regulatory changes brought about by increased funding and staffing at the SEC.   
In Section 2, I provide background information on SEC enforcement actions. In 
Section 3, I review the relevant literature and develop my hypotheses.  I describe my 
sample selection procedures in Section 4 and my empirical models in Section 5.  Section 
6 contains my descriptive statistics and multivariate results and Section 7 reports 
sensitivity tests.  Finally, I analyze SEC penalties in Section 8 and conclude in Section 9. 
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2. BACKGROUND ON SEC ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS 
The Enforcement Division of the SEC oversees the investigation and punishment 
of violations of the law, including those involving financial misstatements. This process 
involves several different steps, which I refer to collectively as the enforcement process. 
Enforcement actions are the formal summaries of events and subsequent injunctions 
against each respondent (i.e., the firm, its managers, or other relevant individuals). In 
trying to explain the SEC’s selection criteria for enforcement targets, it is useful to 
understand the sequence of events that lead to an enforcement action.   
The enforcement process is often triggered by the voluntary announcement of a 
financial restatement by the firm.  Other trigger events may include auditor switches, 
firing of top management, delayed filing of SEC reports, or routine reviews by the SEC. 
For the purposes of this study, only 29 percent of the enforcements in my sample are 
triggered by something other than the company press release announcing a restatement.6 
After the identification of a potential law violation, SEC staff privately request 
information from the firm and carry out an informal investigation.  Following the 
informal investigation, the SEC chooses between two possible paths of actions: (1) stop 
the investigation and take no action, or (2) commence a formal investigation.  As the 
SEC does not publicly announce preliminary investigations, restatements that trigger an 
informal investigation, but are subsequently dropped, will appear as a ―no-enforcement‖ 
observation in my sample.  
                                                 
6 In sensitivity tests, I exclude those firms whose trigger events were something other than the press 
release announcing their restatement and re-run my models.  I find that the results are identical for my 
variables of interest.   
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At the conclusion of the formal investigation, which can take up to several years, 
the SEC formally files an enforcement action against each respondent summarizing the 
complaint and detailing the punishment.  This is the first information released by the 
SEC that is publicly available for review. In general, minor violations are disclosed in 
Administrative Proceedings and more egregious violations in Litigation Releases. 
Beginning in 1982, the SEC also began assigning the secondary designation of 
Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release (AAER) to certain actions that involved 
accountants, auditors, or CPAs.7  Within each enforcement release, the SEC details the 
respondents’ penalties. Potential non-monetary punishments include cease-and-desist 
orders, censures, trading suspensions, or suspensions/bars from serving as an officer, 
director, or financial professional at a public company.  The SEC can also order 
respondents to pay fines or disgorge any gains received from illegal activity.  In 
supplemental analyses (Section VIII), I explore the relationship between corporate 
transparency and the amount of these fines.    
                                                 
7 Over 95 percent of the SEC enforcement actions in my sample are designated as an AAER. Given that 
my sample consists only of restatements, which tend to involve accountants, this relatively high 
percentage is not surprising. When I eliminate the five observations that received a non-AAER 
enforcement action, my results are unchanged. Therefore, although I use the terminology ―SEC 
enforcement action,‖ my results can also apply more specifically to a sample of ―AAERs.‖ 
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3. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Prior research often uses SEC enforcement actions or AAERs as a proxy for 
fraudulent reporting (Dechow et al. 1996; Beneish 1999; Erickson et al. 2006; Dechow 
et al. 2008; Armstrong et al. 2008; Johnson et al. 2009; Peterson 2008, among others).   
These samples have been used to answer questions such as: (1) which ex ante 
characteristics of firms are most likely to predict fraudulent reporting, or (2) how are 
managers and firms punished after an enforcement action or AAER is issued against 
them?   This literature stream generally compares SEC sanctioned firms to others in the 
population, whereas I compare characteristics between those firms that could have been 
sanctioned (i.e., those with a restatement) to those that are sanctioned (i.e., those with a 
restatement and SEC enforcement action).   
Peterson (2008) also predicts which restatement firms will be sanctioned by the 
SEC, but he does so only on a select group of restatements, namely those involving 
revenue. In the main analysis, he documents that firms with complex revenue 
recognition processes are more likely to restate revenue.  In trying to distinguish 
between two potential theories, he develops an AAER prediction model and finds that 
firms with complex revenue recognition policies are less likely to receive an AAER.  My 
paper adds to Peterson (2008) by incorporating a broader set of restatements (i.e., those 
stemming from a wide range of accounting issues) and exploring the effect of corporate 
transparency on the SEC’s decision to issue an enforcement action.  
Firms are encouraged to be fully transparent about their financial statements, 
especially when faced with a restatement.  SEC Chairman Christopher Cox recently 
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made the following comment: ―What hasn’t changed in 75 years is the importance of full 
disclosure—sunlight remains the best disinfectant for problems in our capital markets 
(Taub 2008).‖  The SEC has also indicated that transparency is an important 
consideration when deciding on the appropriate course of action following a violation of 
the law.  They pose the question, ―Did the company promptly, completely, and 
effectively disclose the existence of the misconduct to the public [and] to regulators?‖ 
and suggest that an affirmative answer may reduce SEC sanctions (SEC 2001).  This 
anecdotal evidence suggests that more transparent corporate actions following a 
restatement may be rewarded by regulators; however, the actual effect of corporate 
transparency is an empirical question.  I explore the influence of three corporate actions 
on the likelihood of receiving an SEC sanction from a restatement and develop 
hypotheses for each below.   
Company-Initiated Independent Investigations 
Upon the discovery of a potential accounting misstatement, a firm may choose to 
conduct its own internal investigation into the problem.  Bernile and Jarrell (2009) report 
that 89 percent of firms implicated in the options backdating scandal conduct an internal 
investigation into the matter, with the cost of these investigations being as high as $70 
million (Mercury Interactive) and 27,000 person-hours (Apple Computer).  Hennes et al. 
(2008) use data on company-initiated investigations to classify restatements as errors or 
irregularities. Specifically, they consider a restatement to be more severe (i.e., an 
irregularity) if any one of three conditions is met: (1) variants of the words ―fraud‖ or 
―irregularity‖ are used to describe the restatement, (2) the SEC or DOJ investigates the 
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restatement, or (3) the restating firm independently investigates the misstatement.  They 
conclude that controlling for the type of restatement, error versus irregularity, is critical 
to interpreting CEO/CFO turnover rates following a restatement.8   
Despite the potential costs, a firm may initiate an independent investigation for 
several reasons.  First, independent investigations provide unbiased information about 
the extent of the accounting problem, the individuals responsible, and any systematic 
control failures that contributed to the misstatement.  This information is often an 
important precursor to additional actions taken by the firm, including the firing of the 
responsible individual(s).  Second, managers may use independent investigations as a 
way to restore trust with investors.  If shareholders view the initiation of an independent 
investigation as a sign of corporate transparency and trust, the negative stock price 
response to the restatement may be mitigated (Feroz et al. 1991).  Finally, an 
independent investigation may be initiated in the hopes of eliminating the need for 
regulatory action against the firm.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that the SEC may ―give 
the company credit for self-disclosure…ranging from a decrease in penalties to a 
decision not to bring charges at all‖ (Foley & Lardner LLP 2005).  For example, after 
investigating the restatement of Seaboard Corporation in 2001 the SEC announced that it 
would not take action against the firm because of its prompt and thorough response to 
the problem, including hiring an outside law firm to conduct an inquiry and giving 
                                                 
8 The nature of my study limits the use of Hennes et al.’s (2008) error versus irregularity classification 
scheme as a control for severity. For example, of the three inputs into their measure of irregularity, one 
(SEC enforcement action) is the dependent variable in my model and another (company-initiated 
independent investigation) is a variable of interest. I include their third input, use of the words ―fraud‖ or 
―irregularity,‖ as a control variable in my model.  
  
13 
13 
complete cooperation to SEC staff.9  If the SEC routinely rewards cooperative behavior 
on the part of a company, independent investigations may reduce the likelihood of an 
SEC sanction.   
However, I present two potential scenarios in which investigations may increase 
the likelihood of an SEC sanction, rather than decrease it.  First, when businesses 
voluntarily provide information about a misstatement to the SEC, ―large expenditures of 
government…resources can be avoided (SEC 2001).‖  This occurs because the SEC’s 
cost of identifying misstatement firms and gathering additional information about them 
is reduced.  The SEC, faced with limited resources, may therefore decide to target 
investigative firms because its upfront costs are decreased.  Second, as Feroz et al. 
(1991) point out, the disclosure of an internal investigation may attract the attention of 
SEC staff and motivate the SEC to begin its own inquiries. The association between 
company-initiated independent investigations and SEC enforcement actions remains an 
empirical question and leads to my first hypothesis (stated in null form):  
H1: Following a misstatement, company-initiated independent investigations are 
not associated with the likelihood of an SEC enforcement action.   
 
Press Release Prominence 
 In addition to initiating an independent investigation, managers also have 
discretion over the prominence they give restatement information within a press release.   
This is an important decision as recent literature has shown that investors and lawyers 
                                                 
9 Specifically, a cease-and-desist order was issued against Gisela de Leon-Meredith, the former controller 
of Chestnut Hill Farms, a subsidiary of Seaboard Corporation.  However, no action was taken against 
Seaboard Company itself.  See AAER No. 1470 (http://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-
44969.htm) and AAER No. 1471 (http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-44970.htm) for additional 
information on this case.   
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respond differently to press release information placed in different locations (Bowen et 
al. 2005; Files et al. 2008; Gordon et al. 2008).  For example, Bowen et al. (2005) 
compare the emphasis given to pro forma and GAAP earnings within a press release and 
find that investors react more strongly to the metric placed in a more prominent location 
in the press release.  Specifically focusing on restatement disclosures, Files et al. (2008) 
and Gordon et al. (2008) find that restatement information displayed more prominently 
in a press release influences investors.  The results in Files et al. (2008) suggest that 
investors initially overestimate the importance of restatements disclosed in the headline 
of a press release (as opposed to the text of the press release), but subsequently correct 
their over-reaction.  Following a significant downward price drift of -2.4 percent for 
medium prominence firms, monthly returns for the high and medium prominence firms 
are not significantly different from one another.  This price correction has important 
implications because it suggests that restatement severity does not differ between high 
and medium prominence firms.  In addition, Files et al. (2008) document that restating 
firms with more prominent disclosures are also more likely to be involved in a class 
action lawsuit.  My study extends and complements this research by determining how 
more transparent press release disclosures influence another external party: the SEC.  
 SEC staff often scan news reports and company press releases to identify 
potential violations of the law (DeFond et al. 2008).  In fact, Feroz et al. (1991) 
document that one-third of all SEC leads arise from the financial press. However, as 
limited attention theory (Hirshleifer and Teoh 2003) suggests, individuals can only 
attend to a limited set of cues and, when different cues compete for attention, more 
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salient or vivid ones capture greater attention.  As such, I hypothesize that restatement 
information displayed in a more prominent location in a press release will attract the 
attention of SEC staff and increase the likelihood of an enforcement action.  In addition, 
more prominently disclosed restatements may increase the publicity of the restatement in 
the eyes of media and investors.  In an effort to sanction the highest profile cases, the 
SEC may therefore choose those restatements that are disclosed in a more visible 
manner.  I make a one-directional hypothesis as follows (stated in null form): 
H2: Greater prominence given to a restatement in a press release does not 
increase the likelihood of an SEC enforcement action.  
 
SEC Filings 
While press release prominence addresses the transparency of information within 
a press release, my third measure of corporate transparency focuses on the type of SEC 
filing used to disclose the restatement. Myers et al. (2008) analyze the restatement 
disclosure methods of firms using a classification scheme similar to mine but, unlike my 
research, also identify restatements that are announced only in SEC filings (and not a 
press release).  They find that more transparent disclosures result in more negative stock 
price reactions to the restatement announcement. However, disclosure transparency does 
not affect market reactions for firms with high levels of institutional ownership, 
suggesting that sophisticated investors uncover poorly disclosed restatements. In 
concurrent research, Plumlee and Yohn (2008b) also analyze the stock market reaction 
to restatement announcements and find results similar to those in Myers et al. (2008).  
I extend the results of Myers et al. (2008) and Plumlee and Yohn (2008b) by 
determining whether the type of SEC filing impacts the SEC’s response to the 
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restatement. Although the market generally reacts less to SEC filings than to press 
releases (Foster et al. 1983; Stice 1991; Chung et al. 2003; Amir and Livnat 2005), I 
argue that SEC staff will pay special attention to these filings because they are directly 
disclosed to the SEC. If staff members identify restatements by scanning SEC reports 
then, as with press releases, more transparent disclosure (i.e., Form 8-K) could lead to a 
higher probability of being issued an enforcement action.   
On the other hand, the SEC may purposefully reward firms using more 
transparent SEC filings.  Glass Lewis & Co., LLP (2006) recently identified many firms 
that disclosed their restatements only in regular periodic filings (i.e., 10-K, 10-Q) or not 
at all, which they label ―stealth restatements‖. This discovery increased the emphasis on 
restatement disclosures and led to recommendations that the government ―take 
appropriate corrective action against the companies determined to have filed a deficient 
filing (GAO 2006a).‖10 If the SEC is actively pursuing cases of poor restatement 
disclosure, then high transparency may actually reduce the likelihood of an SEC 
sanction. The association between the type of SEC filings used to disclose the 
restatement and the likelihood of an SEC sanction is an empirical question and leads to 
my third hypothesis (stated in null form): 
H3: The type of SEC filing used to disclose a restatement is not associated with 
the likelihood of an enforcement action.   
                                                 
10 The manner in which restatements are disclosed in SEC filings varies.  A Form 8-K is designed to report 
important changes in a firm’s operations or financial condition between periodic reports.  As a restatement 
often fits this description, many firms prior to 2004 elected to disclose their restatement on a Form 8-K.  In 
2004, the SEC passed the ―Final Rule: Additional Form 8-K Disclosure Requirements and Acceleration of 
Filing Date‖ (SEC 2004b), which instituted the mandatory use of a Form 8-K (Item 4.02) when investors 
should ―no longer rely on‖ past financial statements (i.e., a restatement).  Restatements are also often 
disclosed in an amended filing (i.e., 10-K/A or 10-Q/A) with the ―A‖ alerting investors that something has 
changed.   
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The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
Finally, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 changed the SEC’s Enforcement 
Division in several ways, potentially altering any associations between corporate 
transparency and the likelihood of an enforcement action.  SOX authorized increased 
funding for the SEC, more than doubling its budget over a four-year period, from $414 
million in 2001 to $888 million in 2005. This budget increase led to the hiring of over 
1,000 new employees.  As shown in Figure 1, these additional resources have allowed 
the SEC to increase the number of cases it pursues each year and have therefore led to an 
increase in the number of enforcement actions issued after SOX (U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce 2006).11   
In addition, SOX mandated that the SEC review the financial statements of each 
public company once every three years. This work is accomplished through the Division 
of Corporate Finance and the Office of Compliance and Inspections. When serious 
deficiencies or violations of the law are discovered, they are referred to the SEC’s 
Division of Enforcement for further investigation. In the last few years, the number of 
deficiencies detected by the examination staff has increased substantially (from 393 
cases in 2003 to 917 cases in 2004). This suggests that SEC staff is able to identify more 
potential violations of the law internally and may no longer rely on the transparency of 
information to aid their search.  The changes initiated by SOX lead to the following 
                                                 
11 The data in Figure 1 is compiled from the SEC’s Annual Reports for 1997-2005. It includes more 
enforcement actions than my sample because it covers all law violations (including bribery, Regulation FD 
violations, broker-dealer cases, insider trading, etc.), not just misstatements. 
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three hypotheses addressing the impact of SOX on corporate transparency (stated in null 
form): 
H4a: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 did not alter the association between 
company-initiated independent investigations and the likelihood of an SEC 
enforcement action.   
 
H4b: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 did not alter the association between 
press release prominence and the likelihood of an SEC enforcement action. 
 
H4c: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 did not alter the association between the 
type of SEC filing used to disclose a restatement and the likelihood of an SEC 
enforcement action. 
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4. SAMPLE SELECTION AND DATA DESCRIPTION 
My sample of restatement observations spans nine years, 1997-2005, and is taken 
from the databases compiled by the General Accounting Office (GAO 2003, 2006a,b).12 
In total, the GAO identified 2,443 press releases announcing a restatement during this 
time period. The GAO database tracks restatements based on the date the company first 
announced the restatement in a press release, not the date on which adjusted financial 
statements are filed.  Restatement announcements involving stock splits, changes in 
accounting principles, and other restatements that were not made to correct errors in the 
application of accounting principles are generally excluded from this dataset (GAO 
2003, 2006a,b).13 
Table 1 reconciles my sample to the GAO list. Eight hundred and ninety four 
observations are eliminated due to missing Compustat and CRSP data. To mitigate the 
influence of outliers, I remove those observations whose abnormal returns around the 
announcement date fall in the top or bottom one percent of the distribution (31 
observations).  Using the remaining sample of just over 1,500 observations, I hand 
collect information from each press release announcement (acquired using Lexis-Nexis 
and the date provided by the GAO), including the misstated periods, the dollar earnings 
                                                 
12 The GAO prepared a report for the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 
chaired by Senator Sarbanes, in 2003 and two additional reports in 2006.  The first report identified 919 
unique firm restatements spanning from January 1, 1997 to June 30, 2002.  The second identified 1,390 
restatements spanning from July 1, 2002 to September 30, 2005.  The third identified 134 restatements 
between October 1, 2005 and December 31, 2005.  This database also identified an additional 262 
observations through June 30, 2006.  I end my sample in 2005, however, to allow three years to track the 
results of SEC actions.   
13 Some restatements included in this dataset, however, still appear to be unintentional, technical errors, 
rather than serious accounting irregularities.  I use five different measures of severity, along with 
additional restatement characteristics, to control for the effect less severe restatements may have on my 
results.  
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effect of the misstatement, the prominence of the restatement information within the 
release, and whether the company initiated its own investigation into the misstatement. I 
omit 185 firms from the final sample because I could not find a press release announcing 
a restatement and another 50 that did not report the misstated periods. As the GAO 
database is organized by restatement-level observations, rather than firm-level 
observations, some firms appear in the original sample more than once. In these 
instances, I carefully review the restatement announcements and eliminate 34 
observations that were simply reiterating or repeating a restatement already documented 
in an earlier press release. In each case, I retain only the earliest announcement of the 
restatement. My final sample consists of 1,249 unique restatement observations.   
Information on SEC enforcement actions is a combination of data from Karpoff 
et al.’s (2008a,b,c) sample of enforcement actions from 1977-2006 and hand collection 
from the SEC’s website (www.sec.gov).14 I match Karpoff et al.’s (2008a,b,c) data to my 
original sample of restatement firms, then confirm each match is accurate by verifying 
that the enforcement action is issued in direct response to the misstatement.  For those 
restatement-firms which did not match their data, I search the SEC’s website for 
additional SEC enforcement actions against them. I consider a restatement observation 
to have an enforcement action if any employee of the firm, or the firm itself, is a 
                                                 
14 More specifically, Karpoff et al.’s (2008a,b,c) sample includes all enforcement actions initiated by the 
SEC and DOJ for financial misrepresentation. This includes violations of one or more of three provisions 
of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, as amended by the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977: (i) 
15(b)(2)(A), which requires firms to keep and maintain books and records that accurately reflect all 
transactions; (ii) 15(b)(2)(B), which requires firms to devise and maintain a system of internal accounting 
controls, and (iii) 15(b)(5), which establishes that no person shall knowingly circumvent or knowingly fail 
to implement a system of internal accounting controls or knowingly falsify any book, record, or account.   
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respondent in an SEC Administrative Proceeding or Litigation Release.  I find 119 of my 
1,249 restatements (10 percent) result in one or more enforcement actions.  
Finally, for each firm in my sample, I collect the type of SEC filing used to 
disclose its restatement. I first merge restatement filing data from the Audit Analytics 
(AA) restatement database into my sample, keeping only those SEC filings made within 
60 days of the original press release filing. When the AA database provides no 
information about a particular firm, or the filing occurs more than 60 days after the press 
release, I hand collect information from the SEC’s website. I carefully review each SEC 
filing to ensure that it correctly matches the restatement in question.   
Table 2 provides descriptive information about the sample. Table 2, Panel A, 
reports the distribution of restatement firms over time. The frequency of reported 
restatements increases almost monotonically across time, with the largest number of 
restatements (n = 407) occurring in 2005. This increase in restatements is especially 
evident when looking at the frequency before and after SOX: 479 restatements were 
announced during the six year period of 1997-2002 and 770 restatements were 
announced in the three year period of 2003-2005. For each year, Panel A also provides 
information on the number of restatements that eventually lead to an SEC enforcement 
action (the actual sanction is often issued in a subsequent year, following the completion 
of the investigative process). For example, 158 restatements were announced in 2002, 
twenty-four of which (20 percent) led to eventual sanctions by the SEC. Despite the 
higher frequency of restatements in the post-SOX era, the SEC has actually sanctioned a 
lower percentage of these restatement firms (43 percent in the post-SOX era versus 57 
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percent in the pre-SOX era), consistent with restatements after 2002 being less severe 
(Hennes et al. 2008; Plumlee and Yohn 2008a; Scholz 2008). Figure 2 provides a 
graphical depiction of the number of restatements and the number of SEC sanctions 
(relating to a given restatement) in my sample by year.  
Table 2, Panel B, provides the percentage of observations receiving an SEC 
sanction under each corporate transparency category. Thirty-one percent of firms 
initiating an independent investigation are sanctioned by the SEC (44 percent and 26 
percent in the pre- and post-SOX periods, respectively), while only seven percent of 
those without an investigation are sanctioned. Firms using headline press release 
disclosure are more likely to be sanctioned by the SEC (12 percent) than firms disclosing 
the restatement in the text of a press release (eight percent). In the pre-SOX period, 25 
percent of firms disclosing a restatement on a Form 8-K are sanctioned by the SEC, 
compared to only six percent in the post-SOX period. Additionally, while the SEC only 
sanctioned two percent of firms using the least transparent SEC filing method in the pre-
SOX period, the sanction rate rises to 12 percent in the post-SOX period.  It appears that, 
after SOX, the SEC is better able to identify (or is more inclined to sanction) poorly 
disclosed restatements.  
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5. EMPIRICAL MODEL AND VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS 
 To test H1-H3, I estimate the following logistic regression on my full sample of 
restatement firms (1997-2005).  To address H4, I use two different designs.  First, I run 
the following regression on the pre- (1997-2002) and post-SOX (2003-2005) periods and 
test coefficient differences between the two time periods.15  Second, I estimate the model 
using all sample years and interact POST-SOX (equal to 1 if an observation falls in the 
post-SOX period) with each corporate transparency measure:  
SEC ENFORCEMENT = α + β1-3[Corporate Transparency] + β4-8[Restatement Severity]  
+ β9-12[Restatement Characteristics] + β13-15[Firm 
Characteristics] + β16-x[Other Controls] + ε (1) 
 
where SEC ENFORCEMENT is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the SEC issued an 
enforcement action against the company as a result of its restatement and 0 otherwise.  
Corporate transparency is measured using three different constructs, as mentioned 
earlier.  I code INVESTIGATION as 1 if the company initiated an independent 
investigation into its accounting misstatement and 0 otherwise.  I define an independent 
investigation as one undertaken by non-management individuals, including an 
independent audit committee, a special committee of outside directors, an outside 
forensic firm or legal counsel, or an auditing firm which is not the usual auditor for the 
client (Hennes et al. 2008).  PROMINENCE takes on the value of 3 (high prominence) if 
the restatement is mentioned in the headline of the press release announcing the 
restatement, a value of 2 (medium prominence) if the restatement is not mentioned in the 
                                                 
15 I statistically compare coefficients across the pre- and post-SOX models by combining the parameter-
estimates and associated (co)variance matrices of the two models into a single parameter vector and 
simultaneous covariance matrix.  This design is similar to including interactions, but is easier to interpret 
and does not assume equal residual variance between periods.   
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headline, but discussed in some detail in the body of the text, and a value of 1 (low 
prominence) if the restatement is only mentioned in the footnotes of the press release.  
SEC DISCLOSURE INDEX is assigned a value of 4 if the restatement was announced on 
a Form 8-K, 3 if it was announced in an amended periodic filing (i.e., 10-K/A, 10-Q/A, 
etc.), 2 if it was announced in a routine periodic filing (i.e., 10-K, 10-Q), and 1 if no SEC 
filing was found that discussed the restatement.16   
Control Variables 
Restatement Severity 
 I include five measures of restatement severity in my model.  The first measure, 
RESTATEMENT MAGNITUDE, is the cumulative earnings effect of the restatement 
scaled by total assets.17  If prior year’s earnings were overstated (understated), this has a 
negative (positive) sign.  I expect that the SEC will sanction those restatements having a 
more negative impact on earnings.   My second severity measure, CONCURRENT 
RETURN, is the cumulative abnormal return (raw return minus the CRSP equally-
weighted portfolio return) in the three-day window around the restatement 
announcement period.   I expect the likelihood of enforcement to increase as share prices 
drop, as this usually indicates a more severe accounting problem (Hennes et al. 2008; 
                                                 
16 I generate information on SEC filings from both Audit Analytics and my own hand collection. The lack 
of SEC filing data for some observations could therefore be an outcome of my hand collection techniques 
rather than non-disclosure by the firm. However, these observations can justifiably still be considered the 
least transparent form of disclosure as the restatement was not visible even when explicitly searching for 
it.    
17 I collect the after-tax cumulative earnings effect of the restatement from the press release announcing 
the restatement.  75% of my sample (941 out of 1249) quantifies the magnitude of the restatement in the 
initial announcement.  For the other 25% of my sample, I use conditional mean imputation (Allison 2002) 
to infer the magnitude of the restatement. This process involves running a first stage regression predicting 
RESTATEMENT MAGNITUDE and using the coefficients of this model to predict the values for the 
missing observations.  My results are robust to this procedure, though, as excluding those firms with 
missing data does not change my results. 
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Scholz 2008).   My third measure of severity is a dummy variable (FRAUD/IRREG) 
equal to 1 if any variants of the words ―fraud‖ or ―irregularity‖ are used in the press 
release announcement to describe the restatement.  I expect the likelihood of an 
enforcement action will be greater for these restatements.  My fourth measure estimates 
shareholder’s potential losses due to the restatement (DAMAGES).  I calculate 
DAMAGES as the market capitalization of a firm at its highest point during the misstated 
period minus its market capitalization on the day immediately following the restatement 
announcement, both divided by the total market capitalization of the NYSE on the same 
date.  I expect that the SEC will be more likely to sanction those firms whose 
shareholders suffered more harm (Billings 2008; Karpoff et al. 2008c).18  Finally, I 
measure the number of days between the beginning of the misstated period and the end 
of the misstated period (MISSTATEMENT LENGTH), and predict that the SEC will be 
more likely to sanction firms where the misstatement occurred for a longer period of 
time.   
Restatement Characteristics, Firm Characteristics, and Other Controls 
 I include four variables used by prior research to capture the characteristics of the 
restatement (Wu 2002; Palmrose and Scholz 2004; Palmrose et al. 2004; Files et al. 
2008; Scholz 2008).  REVENUE takes on the value of 1 if any portion of the restatement 
is due to revenue recognition problems and 0 otherwise. I predict a positive association 
between REVENUE and SEC enforcement actions, as improper recognition of revenue is 
                                                 
18 Karpoff et al. (2008c) use a similar measure of shareholder harm and find that it is highly correlated 
with regulator’s estimates of shareholder losses for several cases in which explicit estimates were made 
public. 
  
26 
26 
often viewed as a more severe problem. LEASE takes on the value of 1 if any portion of 
the restatement is related to the accounting for leases and 0 otherwise.  Lease 
restatements peaked in 2005 after the SEC clarified the treatment of certain lease and 
leasehold improvements.  RULE CHANGE is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the 
company mentions an accounting rule (e.g., FAS 133, SAB 101, etc.) as the reason 
behind its restatement and 0 otherwise.  I predict that the SEC will be less likely to 
pursue restatements caused by either a change in rules or a new interpretation of existing 
rules; as such, I predict negative signs on both LEASE and RULE CHANGE.  My fourth 
measure, COUNT, contains the number of different accounting issues per restatement, as 
identified by the GAO.  I expect the SEC to pursue cases involving more GAAP 
violations and therefore predict a positive sign.   
 I control for the size of the restatement firm by including MKTCAP, the natural 
log of market capitalization measured as of the end of the fiscal year prior to the 
restatement announcement.  As fraudulent restatements are more (less) common in the 
technology (financial) industry (Scholz 2008), I also include dummy variables for these 
industries (TECH, FINANCIAL).   POST-SOX takes on the value of 1 if the restatement 
was announced after the passage of SOX (2003-2005) and 0 if the restatement was 
announced before the passage of SOX (1997-2002). PRIOR RETURNS (-252,-2) 
controls for the SEC’s potential interest in firms with more negative stock returns in the 
year before the restatement announcement, and is calculated as the compounded raw 
return over the one-year period ending two days before the restatement announcement.  
Market-based indicators of financial problems may attract the attention of the SEC, 
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leading to a greater likelihood of sanctions (Feroz et al. 1991; Johnson et al. 2009).  
POST RETURNS (+2,+20) measures the compounded raw return in the month after the 
restatement announcement.  I include this variable because stock price drift after the 
restatement announcement is associated with headline disclosure of the restatement 
(Files et al. 2008). SHARE TURNOVER measures the probability that a share was traded 
during a given period.   When shares trade rapidly, more investors are potentially 
harmed by any mispricing caused by the restatement.  I calculate SHARE TURNOVER 
using the following formula from Field et al. (2005): [1-Πt(1-volume tradedt/total 
sharest)], accumulated from daily trading volume (for each day t) over the 1-year period 
ending two days prior to the restatement announcement date.  DISCLOSE INTERVAL 
captures the number of days between the misstatement period end and the restatement 
announcement date.  I predict that SEC sanctions will be more likely for firms delaying 
disclosure of the restatement. Please see Appendix A for a more detailed definition of all 
variables. 
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6. RESULTS 
  
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3, Panel A, provides the mean and median for each variable in my model 
for the full sample and across pre- and post-SOX periods.  The average RESTATEMENT 
MAGNITUDE is higher in the pre-SOX period, as is the average market reaction 
(CONCURRENT RETURN) to each restatement.  The proportion of restatements dealing 
with revenue recognition problems is also higher in the pre-SOX period. Firms 
announcing restatements after SOX tend to have longer misstatement periods 
(MISSTATEMENT LENGTH), more positive PRIOR RETURNS in the year before the 
restatement announcement, and longer disclosure intervals (DISLOSE INTERVAL).    
Table 3, Panel B, compares variable means across observations with and without 
SEC enforcement actions. Several variables are significantly different across groups, 
including FRAUD/IRREG and REVENUE, whose means are higher for those firms 
sanctioned by the SEC.  Additionally, the SEC targets larger firms (MKTCAP), those 
whose misstatement caused larger damages to shareholders (DAMAGES) and lasted for a 
longer period (MISSTATEMENT LENGTH), those with higher SHARE TURNOVER, and 
those with more negative stock returns around the restatement announcement and in the 
previous year (CONCURRENT RETURN, and PRIOR RETURNS).   
Table 4 provides pairwise correlations between variables.  SEC 
ENFORCEMENT is correlated with several variables, including INVESTIGATION and 
PROMINENCE.  The measures of corporate transparency (INVESTIGATION, 
PROMINENCE, and SEC DISCLOSURE INDEX) are positively correlated with one 
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another, although the highest correlation coefficient is only 0.24.  Correlation 
coefficients between other variables are in the expected directions.   
Multivariate Analysis 
Corporate Transparency Results 
Table 5 presents regression results testing the incremental impact of corporate 
transparency on the likelihood of an SEC enforcement action using all years in my 
sample (model 1).  After controlling for restatement severity and other firm and 
restatement characteristics, I find that two of the three corporate transparency measures 
are positively associated with SEC enforcement actions.  Specifically, the coefficients on 
INVESTIGATION and PROMINENCE are both highly significant at the 0.001 and 0.011 
levels, respectively.  Corporations initiating an investigation into the accounting 
misstatement increase their odds of an SEC sanction by 344 percent.  This finding is in 
sharp contrast to the advice often given to managers that initiating an investigation may 
limit their exposure to SEC regulation.  Rather, the results suggest that increased 
transparency about the problem may save the SEC time and money by reducing its initial 
information-generating costs and thus increasing its interest in the case. Additionally, 
firms choosing to disclose their restatement in the headline of a press release are 1.7 
times more likely to be issued an SEC sanction than those firms using the text of the 
press release.  My third measure of corporate transparency, SEC DISCLOSURE INDEX, 
is insignificant (p = 0.928) in this specification of the model.   
In an effort to assess the incremental impact of each transparency measure, I 
include all three in the model simultaneously.  However, in untabulated analysis, I insert 
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each measure separately and find identical results to those discussed above (same sign 
and significance levels on corporate transparency measures and control variables).  In 
sum, I find that more transparent corporate actions following a restatement, specifically 
company-initiated independent investigations and higher press release prominence, 
increase the likelihood of an SEC sanction, rejecting null hypotheses 1 and 2.      
In Table 6, I analyze whether the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has 
impacted the association between corporate transparency and SEC enforcement actions.  
Column 1 includes only those restatements announced in the years 1997-2002.  During 
this period, I find a significant and positive association between all three measures of 
corporate transparency and the likelihood of an SEC enforcement action.  The results on 
INVESTIGATION and PROMINENCE are consistent with those presented in Table 5, 
while the coefficient on SEC DISCLOSURE INDEX is now positive and significant at 
the 0.043 level.  Improving SEC filing transparency by one level (i.e., from an amended 
filing to an 8-K or from a regular filing to an amended filing) increases the odds of an 
SEC enforcement action by 39 percent.    
Column 2 includes only those restatements announced in the years 2003-2005.   
Company-initiated investigations are again positively associated with SEC enforcement 
actions (significant at the 0.001 level), indicating a consistent relationship across both 
the pre- and post-SOX periods. Although, the coefficient on press release prominence is 
now insignificant (p = 0.198) in the post-SOX era, it is not statistically different from the 
coefficient in the pre-SOX period (untabulated, p = 0.499).  The same is true for the pre- 
and post-SOX coefficients on INVESTIGATION (untabulated, p = 0.436), indicating that 
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independent investigations and more transparent press release disclosures are not 
incrementally more or less important predictors of enforcement actions after 2002 than 
before.  Based on these results, I fail to reject H4a and H4b. 
The result on SEC DISCLOSURE INDEX is intriguing as the coefficient is 
significant (p = 0.040), but now with a negative sign.  After SOX, increasing the 
transparency of an SEC filing by one level cuts the odds of having an SEC enforcement 
action in half, or alternatively, decreasing transparency by one level more than doubles 
the likelihood of an SEC sanction.  This result should be of particular interest to 
managers because it supports the idea that the SEC rewards transparent restatement 
disclosures.   The significant association between SEC filings and SEC enforcement 
actions in the pre- and post-SOX periods allows me to reject H3, although the 
coefficients have different signs in each period. The 0.330 coefficient on SEC 
DISCLOSURE INDEX in the pre-SOX period is significantly different from the -0.368 
coefficient in the post-SOX period (untabulated, p = 0.002), indicating a change in the 
association between transparent SEC filings and SEC sanctions after SOX. I therefore 
reject H4c, which states that SOX did not alter the association between SEC filings and 
the likelihood of an enforcement action.   
In Column 3, model 1 is estimated using the full sample of firms and includes 
interaction terms between POST-SOX and all three corporate transparency measures.  
Two of the three interaction term coefficients (INVESTIGATION*POST-SOX and 
PROMINENCE*POST-SOX) are insignificant (p = 0.671 and 0.547, respectively), 
confirming that the impact of investigations and press release disclosures on SEC 
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enforcement actions does not significantly differ across time periods.  The significant (p 
= 0.003) negative coefficient on SEC DISCLOSURE INDEX*POST-SOX again suggests 
that SOX has altered the association between transparent SEC filings and the SEC’s 
decision to issue an enforcement action, consistent with the results in Columns 1 and 2. 
The insignificant (p = 0.251) coefficient on POST-SOX indicates that the likelihood of 
receiving an SEC sanction does not change pre- and post-SOX, after controlling for 
restatement severity and the interaction between POST-SOX and corporate transparency. 
Overall, I find that SOX has changed how certain aspects of corporate 
transparency affect the SEC’s decision to issue an enforcement action.  Specifically, I 
find evidence that the SEC rewards transparent behavior in the post-SOX period by 
reducing the likelihood of a sanction for those firms disclosing the restatement in a 
transparent SEC filing.   However, companies that voluntarily initiate an investigation 
into the restatement have an increased likelihood of an SEC sanction in both time 
periods.   
Control Variable Results 
Although my study focuses on corporate transparency and its influence on the 
likelihood of SEC sanctions, I also provide one of the first analyses of firm and 
restatement characteristics that influence the SEC’s decision to issue an enforcement 
action after a restatement announcement.  As such, I discuss my control variable findings 
in some detail in this section, focusing first on the results in Table 5. 
Of my five restatement severity measures, I find that three are significant in 
predicting the likelihood of an SEC sanction.  Specifically, for a one standard deviation 
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decrease in stock prices around the announcement of a restatement (CONCURRENT 
RETURN), the odds of an enforcement action increase by 29 percent, possibly because 
large stock price declines attract more attention to the case.  Additionally, firms whose 
shareholders have suffered larger declines in market value (DAMAGES) are more likely 
to receive SEC enforcement actions. Consistent with my expectations, longer misstated 
periods (MISSTATEMENT LENGTH) also increase the likelihood of an SEC sanction. 
The two additional measures of severity, RESTATEMENT MAGNITUDE and 
FRAUD/IRREG, do not influence the SEC’s selection criteria after controlling for other 
severity measures.   
Revenue recognition problems (REVENUE) also increase the likelihood of an 
enforcement action.  Comparing standardized coefficients (untabulated), I find that 
REVENUE is the most important predictor of enforcement actions.19  LEASE accounting 
problems and those due to a RULE CHANGE are less likely to result in enforcement. 
The coefficients on POST-SOX and PRIOR RETURNS are negative and significant at the 
0.001 and 0.002 levels, respectively.  Additionally, the coefficient on DISCLOSE 
INTERVAL is positive and significant (p = 0.017), with a one standard deviation increase 
in DISCLOSE INTERVAL increasing the odds of an SEC sanction by 17 percent.   
It is also instructive to analyze how the control variable results change across the 
pre- and post-SOX time periods (Table 6).  Statistical comparison of coefficients across 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 6 reveal that only three variables, FINANCIAL, TECH, and 
                                                 
19 Standardized coefficients measure changes in standard deviation units, therefore enabling me to 
compare the relative importance of each explanatory variable.  However, odds ratios are more useful for 
the interpretation of individual coefficients, especially in the case of dummy variables.  Therefore, I report 
odds ratios in Table 5. 
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DISCLOSE INTERVAL, have a significantly different effect on SEC sanctions in the pre- 
and post-SOX periods.  The coefficients on FINANCIAL and DISCLOSE INTERVAL are 
positive and significant (p = 0.027 and 0.006, respectively) in the post-SOX period only.  
The coefficient on TECH is negative (-0.321) in the pre-SOX period, but positive 
(0.733) in the post-SOX period, although neither coefficient is statistically significant at 
conventional levels (p = 0.421 and 0.108, respectively).20   
The control variable results may be of interest to managers and academics as they 
provide evidence on other characteristics (beyond transparency) that influence the SEC’s 
decision to issue an enforcement action after a misstatement.  I explore the robustness of 
my results below, followed by an analysis of SEC penalties associated with enforcement 
actions.  
                                                 
20 In untabulated analyses, I also include measures of CEO compensation (salary, bonus, in-the-money 
options, and option grants) and CEO trading (proceeds from stock sales and net number of shares sold) 
during the misstated periods as additional control variables in my model. I find that firms whose CEO 
received larger option grants and sold more shares during the misstated period are more likely targets of 
the SEC; other results do not change. 
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7. SENSITIVITY TESTS 
SEC Involved Prior to the Initial Restatement Announcement  
 As mentioned earlier, the initiation of an enforcement action may be trigged by 
events other than the restatement announcement. In these instances, initial inquiries by 
the SEC may have begun before the restatement is announced and corporate actions may 
be influenced by the SEC’s involvement in the case.  To ensure my results are robust to 
this possibility, I search the initial announcement of the restatement and identify those 
firms that mention any form of involvement by the SEC. Of the 119 firms with an SEC 
enforcement action, 34 (29 percent) mention some SEC involvement prior to their 
decision to restate. I exclude these 34 firms from my main models and find identical 
results (same sign and significance level) on my variables of interest for the full sample 
and pre- and post-SOX periods. Control variable results are also the same, with the 
exception of DISCLOSE INTERVAL which is no longer significant in the full sample or 
post-SOX sub-sample (p = 0.407 and 0.287, respectively).  
Creating One Measure of Corporate Transparency 
 To examine the concept of corporate transparency more broadly, I combine the 
three proxies for transparency into one variable.  I create a dummy variable (HIGH 
TRANSPARENCY) equal to one if the company initiates an investigation, or the 
restatement is disclosed in the headline of a press release, or the restatement is disclosed 
on a Form 8-K, and 0 otherwise.  Under this specification, 948 observations are 
classified as having high transparency.  Consistent with my prior findings, the 
coefficient on HIGH TRANSPARENCY is positive and significant in both the full sample 
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(p = 0.011) and in the pre-SOX period (p = 0.011), with transparency more than 
doubling the odds of having an SEC enforcement action.  In the post-SOX period, the 
coefficient on HIGH TRANSPARENCY is no longer significant (p = 0.723).      
Controlling for Self-Selection 
 Self-selection is a potential problem when modeling the relationship between 
corporate transparency and SEC enforcement actions.  That is, underlying (and 
unobservable) factors may drive the decision to undertake more transparent corporate 
actions following a restatement, including manager’s beliefs about the likelihood of an 
SEC sanction.  I use the Heckman (1979) procedure to control for this potential 
endogeneity.  In my selection equation (run on the full sample and both SOX sub-
samples), I predict HIGH TRANSPARENCY and include each variable from my main 
model plus two additional instrumental variables: (1) the level of institutional ownership 
at the end of the quarter prior to the restatement announcement (INST_OWN), and (2) 
whether the restatement firm is audited by a Big 4 auditor at the time of their restatement 
announcement (BIGN).21 I find that both INST (positive coefficient) and BIGN (negative 
coefficient) are significant predictors of HIGH TRANSPARENCY at the 0.024 and 0.004 
levels, respectively (untabulated).22  Neither instrumental variable is associated with the 
likelihood of an SEC enforcement action.  
                                                 
21 Multicollinearity problems arise when I individually predict each corporate transparency measure and 
include multiple inverse Mills ratios into the outcome equation.  To avoid this problem, I instead predict 
HIGH TRANSPARENCY and include only one inverse Mills ratio in the second stage model. 
22 Several other variables are significant predictors of HIGH TRANSPARENCY.  I find significant positive 
coefficients on DAMAGES, MISSTATEMENT LENGTH, TECH, and POST-SOX.  I find significant 
negative coefficients on RULE CHANGE, PRIOR RETURNS, MKTCAP, and DISCLOSE INTERVAL. 
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In Table 7, I include the inverse Mills ratio (generated from the selection 
equation) in my outcome equation and find that HIGH TRANSPARENCY continues to 
significantly increase the likelihood of an SEC sanction in the full sample (p = 0.022) 
and pre-SOX sub-sample (p = 0.027).  Similar to the analysis of a single measure of 
HIGH TRANSPARENCY in the section above, the coefficient is no longer significant (p 
= 0.438) in the post-SOX period.  The inverse Mills ratio is not significant in any model, 
suggesting that the unobservable factors driving corporate transparency do not explain 
SEC sanctions (Li and Prabhala 2005). 
Class Action Lawsuits as a Measure of Severity 
Class action lawsuits are often used as proxies for more severe accounting 
irregularities (Palmrose and Scholz 2004; Armstrong et al. 2008; Hennes et al. 2008).   
Although my main model includes five different controls for restatement severity, I also 
hand-collect litigation data from Stanford’s Securities Class Action Clearinghouse to 
ensure my results are robust to various measures of severity.  I report the frequency of 
class action lawsuits in Table 8, Panel A, along with the overlap of litigation and SEC 
enforcement actions. In total, 149 firms in my sample are subject to class action lawsuits 
as a result of their restatement, slightly more than the number with SEC sanctions (119).  
I include a class action lawsuit indicator variable (LITIGATION) in my model, 
which takes on the value of 1 if a class action lawsuit was filed in response to the 
restatement and 0 otherwise.  As shown in Table 8, Panel B, the coefficient on 
LITIGATION is positive and significant in my full sample (p = <0.001), after controlling 
for transparency and other severity measures.  LITIGATION is also positive and 
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significant in both the pre- and post-SOX sub-samples (p <0.001 in both models, 
untabulated).  Importantly, the sign and significance levels of the corporate transparency 
variables do not change.    
Distinguishing between Enforcement Actions Issued Against the Firm, Its 
Managers, or Both 
 My sample selection procedures involve matching restatements to SEC sanctions 
if the firm, or anyone employed by the firm, is a respondent in an SEC enforcement 
action.  Within my sample, 18 (out of 119) enforcement actions only cite individuals 
employed by the firm, rather than the firm itself.  As the SEC usually credits the 
restating firm as a whole for independent investigations, I exclude the 18 observations 
against only individuals and find that my corporate transparency results are identical to 
those discussed earlier.  Additionally, 11 (out of 119) SEC enforcement actions are 
issued against only the firm and not any individuals.  In a separate regression, I exclude 
these 11 observations and also find identical results.  The remaining 90 enforcement 
actions are issued against both the firm and one or more individuals.   
Alternative Definitions of Pre- and Post-SOX Time Periods 
 Hypotheses 4a-c examine the SEC’s enforcement decisions in the pre- and post-
SOX periods, defined in previous tests as years 1997-2002 and 2003-2005, respectively.  
I include year 2002 observations (the year in which SOX was passed) in the pre-SOX 
period because the effects of SOX on the SEC were unlikely to occur until the following 
year.  However, in untabulated analyses, I perform two additional tests: (1) I include 
year 2002 in the post-SOX period, and (2) I exclude year 2002 from my analyses 
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entirely.  Under both specifications, the results of INVESTIGATION and SEC 
DISCLOSURE INDEX are the same as those reported in Tables 5 and 6.  The coefficient 
on PROMINENCE varies slightly, though, as the definition of pre- and post-SOX 
changes. For the sake of brevity, I only discuss the results found when re-running my 
interaction model (Table 6, column 3), as this specification examines both the pre- and 
post-SOX periods simultaneously.  In test (1), I find that press release prominence 
significantly influences the likelihood of an SEC sanction in both the pre- and post-SOX 
periods (PROMINENCE is significant at the p = 0.027 and the joint test of 
PROMINENCE + PROMINENCE*POST-SOX is significant at the p = 0.030 level).  In 
test (2), the coefficient on PROMINENCE is significant in the pre-SOX period (p = 
0.037), but is no longer significant in the post-SOX period (chi-square p = 0.266), 
consistent with the results presented in Table 6. 
  
40 
40 
8. SUPPLEMENTAL ANALYSIS: MONETARY PENALTIES 
 Results in the previous sections suggest that the likelihood of receiving an SEC 
enforcement action, on average, is higher when a firm is more transparent in its response 
to a restatement.  However, the SEC may choose to reward firms for transparent 
behavior by seeking lighter penalties, rather than eliminating the enforcement action 
entirely.  In this section, I explore the relationship between corporate transparency and 
monetary penalties. 
For my sample of 119 SEC enforcement actions, I separately collect data on the 
monetary penalties paid by individuals and the restatement firm.  On average, 
individuals pay $4.2 million in fines during my sample period, while firms pay an 
average of $37.3 million (Table 9, Panel A).  Table 9, Panel B, documents the 
distribution of these penalties across each of the three corporate transparency measures.  
Firms that independently investigate their restatements pay, on average, $31.5 million 
less in SEC penalties than firms not initiating an investigation.  Individual penalties, on 
the other hand, decrease an average of $5.4 million when the restatement is disclosed on 
a Form 8-K, rather than an amended or regular SEC filing.  
To further explore the relationship between corporate transparency and SEC 
penalties, I estimate the following OLS model on all years in my sample (1997-2005) 
and interact each corporate transparency variable with POST-SOX:23  
 
                                                 
23 I also run a truncated tobit regression which employs a lower bound of zero for IND_PENALTY and 
FIRM_PENALTY.  The corporate transparency results are consistent with those presented. 
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IND_PENALTY or FIRM_PENALTY = α + β1-7[Corporate Transparency Pre- and Post- 
 SOX] + β8-13[Shareholder Harm] +  
β14[Deep Pockets] + β15-17[Enforcement   (2) 
Complexity] + ε 
 
where IND_PENALTY equals the total dollar value of fines and disgorgement of profits 
paid by individuals, winsorized at the 99th percentile. Monetary penalties are summed 
across all individuals in a given firm who are sanctioned for the restatement. 
FIRM_PENALTY equals the total dollar value of fines and disgorgement of profits paid 
by the restating firm, winsorized at the 99th percentile.  Model 2 includes each of the 
three corporate transparency measures, along with other characteristics known to predict 
penalties (Karpoff et al. 2008c).24   
Column 1 of Table 9, Panel C, shows the results of predicting IND_PENALTY. 
The SEC appears to levy higher fines on individuals after SOX, as indicated by the 
positive and significant (p = 0.061) coefficient on POST-SOX.  Additionally, the joint 
test of SEC DISCLOSURE INDEX + SEC DISCLOSURE INDEX*POST-SOX is 
negative and significant (F = 8.68), suggesting that individual penalties are lower in the 
post-SOX period when more transparent SEC filings are used.  Thus, in conjunction with 
my previous finding, the SEC rewards Form 8-K disclosure in the post-SOX period by 
lowering the likelihood of a sanction and requiring a smaller monetary penalty if 
sanctioned.  The other two transparency measures do not significantly influence 
individual penalties.   
                                                 
24 RESTATEMENT MAGNITUDE, CONCURRENT RETURN (-1,+1), FRAUD/IRREG, DAMAGES, 
SHARE TURNOVER, and DISCLOSE INTERVAL are included as proxies for the level of shareholder 
harm due to the restatement.  MKTCAP captures the idea that penalties may be influenced by the 
defendant’s ability to pay.  MISSTATEMENT LENGTH, NUM PROCEEDINGS, and NUM VIOLATIONS 
are included as proxies for the complexity of the enforcement action.  Please see the Appendix for detailed 
definitions of each variable.  
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Column 2 of Table 9, Panel C, shows the results of predicting FIRM_PENALTY.  
Firms initiating an independent investigation in the pre-SOX period are, on average, 
fined $92.4 million less than firms not initiating an investigation, after controlling for the 
severity of the restatement and other factors. Therefore, although my previous findings 
suggest that the SEC is more likely to sanction a firm with an independent investigation, 
the SEC does appear to reward cooperative behavior with smaller penalties.  In the post-
SOX period, however, independent investigations are not significantly associated with 
lower penalties.  Press release prominence and the type of SEC filing used to disclose a 
restatement do not influence firm penalties in either period.  Control variable results are 
untabulated, but the results are consistent with my expectations and the findings of 
Karpoff et al. (2008c).  
These findings extend previous research that examines the determinants of 
penalties following an SEC enforcement action (Karpoff et al. 2008c).  Additionally, 
they supplement my previous tests which predict the likelihood of an SEC sanction by 
providing a more complete picture of the SEC’s response to corporate transparency. 
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9. CONCLUSION 
I investigate whether corporate transparency about a restatement influences the 
SEC’s decision to issue an enforcement action against the restating firm. My results 
suggest that, prior to SOX, restatements disclosed in a more transparent manner either in 
the press release (i.e., headline disclosure) or SEC filing (i.e., 8-K disclosure) are more 
likely to be sanctioned by the SEC. Also, the initiation of an independent investigation 
increases the likelihood of an SEC enforcement action, but reduces the monetary 
penalties paid by the restating firm as a result of a sanction.  Following SOX, more 
transparent SEC filings now reduce the likelihood of an SEC enforcement action and are 
associated with a smaller penalty when an individual is sanctioned, providing evidence 
of a reward for transparency in the post-SOX era.   
These results extend prior research (Bowen et al. 2005; Files et al. 2008; Gordon 
et al. 2008; Myers et al. 2008) by providing the first evidence on how corporate 
transparency affects the SEC’s decision to issue an enforcement action. Managers of 
restating firms may be interested in the findings as they document how managerial 
actions following a misstatement affect the likelihood of an SEC sanction. More 
specifically, my results speak to the consequences of company-initiated investigations, 
namely, an increased likelihood of SEC sanction, but with a reduction in penalties. 
Additionally, my post-SOX analysis provides preliminary evidence on the benefits of 
increased funding to the SEC, as it appears the SEC is using its resources to, among 
other things, penalize accounting restatements that are disclosed in a less transparent 
manner.     
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Finally, in order to determine the influence of corporate transparency, I develop a model 
predicting which restatement firms will be sanctioned by the SEC that includes measures 
of restatement severity, restatement characteristics, and firm characteristics. The findings 
of this model may be of interest to academics doing research on SEC enforcement 
actions and/or AAERs as it documents characteristics of firms in the different samples.  
For example, revenue is the most important predictor of SEC enforcement actions in my 
model, suggesting that revenue misstatements may be overrepresented in AAER 
samples. 
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APPENDIX A  
 
Variable Name Variable Definition 
  
SEC ENFORCEMENT An indicator variable equal to 1 if the SEC issued an enforcement 
action against the company as a result of a restatement, and 0 
otherwise.  This data is a combination of information from 
Karpoff et al. (2008a,b,c) and hand collection from the SEC’s 
website: www.sec.gov.   
INVESTIGATION An indicator variable equal to 1 if the company initiated an 
independent (non-SEC) investigation into its accounting issues 
and 0 otherwise.  I define an independent investigation as one 
undertaken by non-management individuals, counsel, and/or 
auditing firms that are not the usual auditor for the client.  This 
data is hand-collected from the press release and SEC filing 
announcing the restatement.   
PROMINENCE Coded 3 for restatements mentioned in the headline of the press 
release; 2 for restatements not mentioned in the headline, but 
discussed in some detail within the body of the text; and 1for 
restatements only mentioned in the footnotes of the press release. 
This data is hand-collected from the press release announcing the 
restatement. 
SEC DISCLOSURE INDEX Coded 4 for restatements reported on a Form 8-K; 3 for 
restatements reported in an amended filing; 2 for restatements 
reported in regular annual or quarterly filings; and 1 for 
restatements not reported in any SEC report.   Data is collected 
from Audit Analytics (AA).  I hand collect information using 
EDGAR if AA did not have information on the firm in my 
sample or the SEC disclosure date in AA is more than 60 days 
after the press release disclosure date or more than 3 days before.   
 
The specific SEC reports included in each category are as 
follows: 
Level 4: 8-K or 8-K/A 
Level 3: 10-K/A, 10-Q/A, 10-KSB/A, 10-QSB/A, 10-K405/A, 
10-Q405/A 
Level 2: 10-K, 10-Q, 6-K, NT 10-K, NT 10-K, 10-K405, 10-
Q405 
Level 1: no SEC report was found on Edgar that discussed the 
restatement in question 
RESTATEMENT MAGNITUDE  The cumulative after-tax earnings effect of the restatement scaled 
by total assets measured as of the fiscal year end prior to the 
restatement announcement, winsorized at 1 and 99%.  If prior 
year’s earnings were overstated (understated), MAGNITUDE has 
a negative (positive) sign.  This data is hand-collected from the 
press releases announcing the restatement.    
 (continued on next page) 
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Variable Name Variable Definition 
  
 Missing data is imputed using the mean conditional imputation 
method discussed in Allison (2002).  A first stage regression is 
run on those firms that included an amount in their press release, 
predicting MAGNITUDE.  The coefficients from this regression 
are used to generate predicted values for those observations with 
missing amounts.  Missing values are imputed for less than 25% 
of my observations (308/1249).   
CONCURRENT RETURN (-1,+1) The cumulative abnormal return, calculated as the raw stock 
return minus the CRSP equally-weighted market portfolio return, 
measured over the three-day period centered on the restatement 
announcement date, collected from CRSP.   
FRAUD/IRREG An indicator variable equal to 1 if any variants of the words 
―fraud‖ or ―irregularity‖ are used when disclosing an accounting 
restatement and 0 otherwise.  This data is hand-collected from the 
press release and SEC filing announcing the restatement.  
DAMAGES ($MM) The firm’s market capitalization at its highest point during the 
violation period (time 0) divided by the total market 
capitalization of the NYSE at the same date, minus its market 
capitalization on the day after the restatement announcement (or, 
if unavailable, on the day of the restatement announcement) (time 
1) divided by the total market capitalization of the NYSE on the 
same date, truncated at zero. This variable is winsorized at the 
95th percentile.  
 
= (Market Cap t=0 FIRM/Market Capt=0 NYSE) – (Market Cap t=1 
FIRM/Market Capt=1 NYSE) 
 
MISSTATEMENT LENGTH The number of days between the beginning of the misstated 
period and the end of the misstated period. 
REVENUE An indicator variable equal to 1 if any part of the restatement is 
due to revenue recognition problems and 0 otherwise.  This data 
is reported in the GAO database. 
LEASE An indicator variable equal to 1 if any part of the restatement is 
related to the accounting for leases and 0 otherwise.  This data is 
hand-collected from the press release announcing the 
restatement.  
RULE CHANGE An indicator variable equal to 1 if the company mentions an 
accounting rule (e.g., FAS 133, EITF 00-10, SAB 101, etc.) as 
the reason behind their upcoming restatement and 0 otherwise.  
This data is hand-collected from the press release announcing the 
restatement.  
 (continued on next page) 
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Variable Name Variable Definition 
  
COUNT The number of different accounting issues per restatement, as 
reported in the GAO database.  
MKTCAP Natural log of market capitalization (closing stock price*common 
shares outstanding) of the firm measured as of the end of the 
fiscal year prior to the restatement announcement.  
FINANCIAL  An indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm operates in the 
financial services sector (SIC codes 6000-6999) and 0 otherwise. 
TECH An indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm operates in a 
technology industry (SIC codes 2833-2836, 3570-3577, 3600-
3674, 7371-7379, 8731-8734) and 0 otherwise.  
POST-SOX An indicator variable equal to 1 if the restatement was announced 
after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (2003-2005) and 0 if it was 
announced before the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (1997-2002).   
PRIOR RETURNS (-252,-2) The compounded raw return over the one-year period ending two 
days before the restatement announcement, collected from CRSP.   
POST RETURNS (+2,+20) The compounded raw returns over the (+2,+20) interval 
following the restatement announcement, collected from CRSP. 
SHARE TURNOVER  A continuous variable measuring the probability that a share was 
traded within a given time period.  It is calculated as: [1-Πt(1-
volume tradedt/total sharest)], accumulated over the 1-year period 
ending two days prior to the restatement announcement date. 
DISCLOSE INTERVAL The number of days between the end of misstated period and the 
restatement announcement date. 
HIGH TRANSPARENCY An indicator variable equal to 1 if INVESTIGATION = 1, OR 
PROMINENCE = 3 (i.e., headline disclosure), OR SEC 
DISCLOSURE INDEX = 4 (i.e., 8-K disclosure) and 0 otherwise.  
INST_OWN The level of institutional ownership at the end of the quarter prior 
to the restatement announcement, scaled by total shares 
outstanding on the same date.  This is data is collected from 
Thompson Financial. 
BIG N An indicator variable equal to 1 if the restatement firm was 
audited by a Big N firm (Arthur Andersen, Deloitte & Touche, 
Ernst & Young, KPMG, and/or PriceWaterhouseCoopers) in the 
year of its restatement announcement and 0 otherwise.  
 (continued on next page) 
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Variable Name Variable Definition 
  
LITIGATION An indicator variable equal to 1 if a class action lawsuit was filed 
in response to the misstated financial statements and 0 otherwise.  
This information is hand-collected from Stanford’s Securities 
Class Action Clearinghouse.   
IND_PENALTY The total dollar value of fines and disgorgement of profits paid 
by individuals to the SEC as a result of an SEC enforcement 
action, winsorized at the 99th percentile.  Monetary penalties are 
summed across all individuals sanctioned for the same 
underlying restatement.  In multivariate regressions, this variable 
is divided by $1,000,000 to allow for more interpretable 
coefficient values. This data is collected from Karpoff et al. 
(2008a,b,c) and the SEC’s website (www.sec.gov). 
FIRM_PENALTY The total dollar value of fines and disgorgement of profits paid 
by the restatement-firm to the SEC as a result of an SEC 
enforcement action, winsorized at the 99th percentile.  In 
multivariate regressions, this variable is divided by $1,000,000 to 
allow for more interpretable coefficient values. This data is 
collected from Karpoff et al. (2008a,b,c) and the SEC’s website 
(www.sec.gov). 
NUM PROCEEDINGS The number of Administrative Proceedings and/or Litigation 
Releases issued in response to any given restatement.  This data 
is collected from Karpoff et al. (2008a,b,c) and the SEC’s 
website (www.sec.gov).  
NUM VIOLATIONS A count variable ranging from 0 to 3, depending on the number 
of different law violations caused by the misstatement.  I focus 
on violations of the following provisions of the Securities and 
Exchange Act of 1934, as amended by the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act of 1977: 15(b)(2)(A) (books and records provision), 
15(b)(2)(B) (internal controls provision), and/or 15(b)(5) 
(circumvention provision).  This data is collected from Karpoff et 
al. (2008a,b,c) and the SEC’s website (www.sec.gov).  
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FIGURE 1 
Total SEC Enforcement Actions across Time 
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The data in this figure is taken from SEC Annual Reports for the years 1997-2005.  These enforcement 
actions relate to all law violations, including misstated financial statements, bribery, Regulation FD 
violations, broker-dealer cases, and insider trading.  The increasing trend in the number of enforcement 
actions confirms that the SEC is sanctioning more violations after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.   
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FIGURE 2 
Restatements and SEC Enforcement Actions across Time 
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This graph depicts the number of restatements in my sample across years and the corresponding number of 
SEC sanctions issued against the restatement firms or its managers. 
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TABLE 1 
Sample Selection Procedures 
 
 Number of 
Observations 
Restatement Firms per GAO study (1997-2005)a 2443 
  
Less: firms without Compustat and CRSP data (894) 
  
Less: outliersb (31) 
  
Less: firms without press release information available (185) 
  
Less: misstatement period unknownc (50) 
  
Less: repeat observationsd (34) 
  
Final Sample 1249 
  
a The General Accounting Office (GAO) prepared a report for the U.S. Senate 
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, chaired by Senator Sarbanes in 
2002 and two reports in 2006.  The first report identified 919 unique firm restatements 
spanning from January 1, 1997 to June 30, 2002.  The second identified 1,390 
restatements spanning from July 1, 2002 to September 30, 2005.  The third identified 134 
restatements between October 1, 2005 and December 31, 2005.   
 
b Outliers were identified as those observations in which the abnormal returns around the 
restatement date fell in the top or bottom 1% of the distribution.   
 
c I eliminate observations without adequate data to determine the misstated periods.  
 
d In some cases, one restatement may be discussed in multiple company-issued press 
releases.  I only retain the observation if it is the first time the restatement has been 
disclosed; all other repeat observations are eliminated.  
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TABLE 2 
Sample Description 
 
Panel A: Distribution of Restatement Firms and SEC Enforcement Actions over Time 
     
 
Year 
Total # of 
Restatements 
Percent of All 
Restatements 
# of Restatement Firms with 
Subsequent SEC Enforcements  
Percent of All SEC 
Enforcements 
1997 33 2.6% 5 4.2% 
1998 24 1.9% 4 3.3% 
1999 70 5.6% 7 5.9% 
2000 83 6.7% 18 15.1% 
2001 111 8.9% 10 8.4% 
2002 158 12.7% 24 20.2% 
Pre-SOX Total 479 38.4% 68 57.1% 
     
2003 166 13.3% 23 19.3% 
2004 197 15.8% 9 7.6% 
2005 407 32.6% 19 16.0% 
Post-SOX Total 770 61.6% 51 42.9% 
     
Sample Total 1249  119  
     
Panel B: Breakdown of Corporate Transparency Measures with SEC Enforcement Actions 
 
 Full Sample Pre-SOX Sample Post-SOX Sample 
  
Total 
Frequency 
Percent 
with SEC 
sanction 
 
Pre-SOX 
Frequency 
Percent 
with SEC 
sanction 
 
Post-SOX 
Frequency 
Percent 
with SEC 
sanction 
Indep. Investigationa       
Yes  129 31% 36 44% 93 26% 
No 1120 7% 443 12% 677 4% 
Total 1249  479  770  
       
Prominenceb       
High (3) 653 12% 207 21% 446 7% 
Medium (2) 537 8% 226 11% 311 6% 
Low (1) 59 0% 46 0% 13 0% 
Total 1249  479  770  
       
SEC Disclosure 
Indexc 
      
8-K (4) 679 9% 118 25% 561 6% 
Amended Filing (3) 185 9% 115 13% 70 3% 
Regular Filing (2) 227 14% 122 17% 105 11% 
No Filing (1)  158 4% 124 2% 34 12% 
Total 1249  479  770  
  
a Independent Investigations are those initiated by the restatement company and undertaken by non-management 
individuals, counsel, and/or auditing firms who are not the usual auditor for the client.   
 
b Press Release Prominence is coded 3 (High Prominence) for any restatement that is mentioned in the headline of a press 
release; coded 2 (Medium Prominence) for those restatements not mentioned in the headline, but discussed in some detail 
within the body of the text; and coded 1(Low Prominence) for those restatements only mentioned in the footnotes of the 
press release. 
 
c SEC Disclosure Index is coded 4 for any restatement that was reported on a Form 8-K; coded 3 for any restatement that 
was reported in an amended filing; coded 2 for any restatement reported in a regular annual or quarterly filing; and coded 
1 for any restatement that was not reported in any SEC report. 
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TABLE 3 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for Full Sample, Pre-SOX, and Post-SOX Periods 
 Full Sample Pre-SOX Sample Post-SOX Sample 
Variablea N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median 
SEC 
ENFORCEMENT 1249 0.10 0 479 0.14 0 770 0.07*** 0 
INVESTIGATION 1249 0.10 0 479 0.08 0 770 0.12*** 0 
PROMINENCE 1249 2.48 3.00 479 2.34 2.00 770 2.56*** 3.00 
SEC DISCLOSURE 
INDEX 1249 3.11 4.00 479 2.47 2.00 770 3.50*** 4.00 
RESTATEMENT 
MAGNITUDEb          
(% of total assets) 1245 -0.90% -0.39% 475 -1.23% -0.68% 770 -0.70%*** -0.29% 
CONCURRENT 
RETURN (-1,+1) 1249 -3.07% -1.20% 479 -4.71% -2.32% 770 -2.04%*** -0.80% 
FRAUD/IRREG 1249 0.03 0 479 0.05 0 770 0.03* 0 
DAMAGESc  1249 0.25 0.05 479 0.24 0.05 770 0.25 0.06 
MISSTATEMENT 
LENGTH 1249 640 453 479 447 364 770 760*** 637 
REVENUE 1249 0.27 0 479 0.37 0 770 0.20*** 0 
LEASE 1249 0.11 0 479 0.01 0 770 0.17*** 0 
RULE CHANGE 1249 0.15 0 479 0.23 0 770 0.10*** 0 
COUNT 1249 1.21 1.00 479 1.19 1.00 770 1.22 1.00 
MKTCAPc ($000) 1246 $3,371.7 $424.7 477 $3,022.8 $278.3 769 $3,588.1*** $514.6 
PRIOR RETURNS 
 (-252,-2) 1249 14.59% 14.90% 479 6.30% 9.59% 770 19.74%*** 17.66% 
POST RETURNS 
(+2,+20) 1241 1.92% 1.25% 473 1.45% 0.92% 768 2.21% 1.29% 
SHARE TURNOVER 1249 0.66 0.71 479 0.65 0.68 770 0.67 0.72 
DISCLOSE 
INTERVAL 1249 189 133 479 171 131 770 200*** 133 
 
 
Panel B: Variable Means - Comparison between Observations With and Without an SEC Enforcement 
Action 
 Full Sample Pre-SOX Sample Post-SOX Sample 
Variablea 
SEC 
Sanction 
No SEC 
Sanction 
SEC 
Sanction 
No SEC 
Sanction 
SEC 
Sanction 
No SEC 
Sanction 
INVESTIGATION 0.34 0.08*** 0.24 0.05*** 0.47 0.10*** 
PROMINENCE 2.65 2.46*** 2.65 2.28*** 2.65 2.56 
SEC DISCLOSURE INDEX 3.17 3.10 3.07 2.37*** 3.29 3.52 
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 3 (continued) 
 Full Sample Pre-SOX Sample Post-SOX Sample 
Variablea 
SEC 
Sanction 
No SEC 
Sanction 
SEC 
Sanction 
No SEC 
Sanction 
SEC 
Sanction 
No SEC 
Sanction 
RESTATEMENT MAGNITUDEb       
(% of total assets) -1.23% -0.87%* -1.31% -1.23% -1.13% -0.70% 
CONCURRENT RETURN (-1,+1) -6.71% -2.68%*** -8.71% -4.05%** -4.04% -1.90%* 
FRAUD/IRREG 0.12 0.03*** 0.13 0.03** 0.10 0.02* 
DAMAGESc  0.53 0.22*** 0.44 0.21*** 0.65 0.23*** 
MISSTATEMENT LENGTH 874 615*** 668 410*** 1147 732*** 
REVENUE 0.52 0.24*** 0.56 0.34*** 0.47 0.18*** 
LEASE 0.03 0.12*** 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.18*** 
RULE CHANGE 0.05 0.16*** 0.04 0.26*** 0.06 0.10 
COUNT 1.37 1.19*** 1.35 1.16** 1.39 1.20* 
MKTCAP ($000) $5,860.4 $3,108.9* $6,275.3 $2,482.0* $5,307.2 $3,466.0 
PRIOR RETURNS (-252,-2) -10.25% 17.20%*** -21.97% 10.98%*** 5.37% 20.76%** 
POST RETURNS (+2,+20) 3.42% 1.77% 5.21% 0.87% 1.14% 2.29% 
SHARE TURNOVER 0.75 0.65*** 0.75 0.63*** 0.76 0.66*** 
DISCLOSE INTERVAL 197 188 164 172 242 197 
       
*, **, and *** indicate the variable means are significantly different across groups (Pre-SOX versus Post-SOX in Panel A; SEC 
sanction versus No SEC sanction in Panel B) at the p = 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 
a All variables are defined in Appendix A.  
 
b Negative (positive) values denote initial overstatement (understatement) of net income.  Missing values are imputed using the 
conditional mean imputation approach outlined in Allison (2002).  Before imputation and winsorization, the average value of 
magnitude as a percent of total assets is -0.93% and the median is -0.22% (n = 959).   
 
c This number is market adjusted (see Appendix A for detailed definition) and represents how much the firm’s market 
capitalization as a  percentage of the market changed from the highest point during their manipulation period to the day after the 
restatement announcement.   
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TABLE 4 
Pearson Correlation Table 
Variable 
SEC 
Action 
 
 
 
Investig Prom 
SEC 
Disclose 
Index Magnitude 
Concurr 
Return 
Fraud/ 
Irreg 
 
 
 
Damage 
Misstate 
Length Rev. Lease 
Rule 
Change Count Mktcap 
 
 
Prior 
Return 
 
 
Post 
Return 
Share 
Turn. 
INVESTIG. 
 
0.25                 
PROM. 0.09 0.11                
SEC 
DISCLOSE 0.02 0.09 0.24               
MAGNITUDE -0.06 -0.04 -0.02 0.13              
CONCURR. 
RETURN -0.12 -0.12 -0.05 0.04 0.18             
FRAUD/ 
IRREG 0.15 0.28 0.03 0.03 -0.05 -0.07            
DAMAGES 0.20 0.06 -0.01 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.07           
MISSTATE 
LENGTH 0.14 0.15 0.10 0.25 -0.01 0.06 0.07 0.13          
REVENUE 0.19 0.09 -0.10 -0.11 -0.09 -0.09 0.07 0.01 -0.05         
LEASE -0.09 -0.06 0.12 0.20 0.07 0.11 -0.07 -0.01 0.24 0.17        
RULE 
CHANGE -0.09 -0.12 -0.24 -0.17 -0.04 0.07 -0.04 0.02 -0.09 0.16 -0.12       
COUNT 
 
0.11 
 
0.04 
 
0.06 
 
0.04 
 
-0.04 
 
-0.05 
 
0.09 0.08 0.06 
 
0.18 
 
-0.06 
 
-0.04      
MKTCAP 0.11 0.02 -0.10 0.08 0.22 0.08 0.03 0.71 0.09 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.06     
PRIOR 
RETURNS 
 
-0.14 
 
-0.03 
 
-0.03 
 
0.02 
 
0.11 
 
0.02 
 
-0.02 -0.06 0.04 
 
-0.08 
 
0.02 
 
0.03 
 
-0.08 
 
-0.06    
POST 
RETURNS 0.03 -0.05 -0.01 0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.00 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.06   
SHARE 
TURNOVER 
 
0.11 
 
0.07 
 
-0.05 
 
0.06 
 
-0.02 
 
-0.04 
 
0.02 0.19 
 
0.06 
 
0.09 
 
0.09 
 
-0.04 
 
0.02 
 
0.36 
 
-0.00 -0.02 
 
 
DISCLOSE 
INTERVAL 0.01 0.00 -0.15 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 0.03 -0.03 0.05 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 
                  
 
Bold values are significant at the p = 0.05 level (two-tailed). 
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TABLE 5 
Likelihood of an SEC Enforcement Action following a Restatement (All Years) 
 
SEC ENFORCEMENT = α + β1-3[Corporate Transparency] + β4-8[Restatement Severity] + β9-12[Restatement 
Characteristics] + β13-15[Firm Characteristics] + β16-20[Other Controls] + ε 
       
 Logistic Regression with Dependent Variable = SEC ENFORCEMENT 
Variablea Predict Coefficient P-value Odds Ratio 
Intercept  -5.679 (<0.001)  
     
Corporate Transparency     
INVESTIGATION ? 1.490 (<0.001) 4.438 
PROMINENCE ( + ) 0.520 (0.011) 1.682 
SEC DISCLOSURE INDEX ? 0.011 (0.928) 1.011 
     
Restatement Severity     
RESTATEMENT MAGNITUDE ( - )b 6.479 (0.191) 651.633 
CONCURRENT RETURN (-1,+1) ( - ) -2.491 (0.009) 0.083 
FRAUD/IRREG ( + ) -0.030 (0.474) 0.970 
DAMAGES ( + ) 0.993 (<0.001) 2.699 
MISSTATEMENT LENGTH ( + ) 0.001 (<0.001) 1.001 
     
Restatement Characteristics     
REVENUE ( + ) 1.314 (<0.001) 3.719 
LEASE ( - ) -1.271 (0.035) 0.281 
RULE CHANGE  ( - ) -1.424 (0.002) 0.241 
COUNT ( + ) 0.138 (0.256) 1.148 
     
Firm Characteristics     
MKTCAP ? 0.007 (0.945) 1.007 
FINANCIAL ? 0.258 (0.462) 1.294 
TECH ? 0.159 (0.577) 1.172 
     
Other Controls     
POST-SOX ? -1.375 (<0.001) 0.253 
PRIOR RETURNS (-252,-2) ( - ) -0.564 (0.002) 0.569 
POST RETURNS (+2,+20) ? 0.977 (0.118) 2.657 
SHARE TURNOVER ? 0.842 (0.112) 2.320 
DISCLOSE INTERVAL ( + ) 0.001 (0.017) 1.001 
     
n  1238c   
Pseudo R2  16.23%   
-2 log likelihood  760.96   
Model chi-square  219.27   
p-value  <0.001   
Correctly Classified  87.4   
     
The p-values are in parentheses to the right of the logistic regression coefficients.  Two-tailed tests are shown for variables 
without a signed prediction; one-tailed tests are shown for variables with a signed prediction.  
 
a See Appendix A for variable definitions.  
b A negative (positive) sign on RESTATEMENT MAGNITUDE would indicate that restatements resulting in more negative 
adjustments to earnings increase (decrease) the likelihood of an SEC sanction.  
c 11 firms were excluded from the regression due to missing POST RETURN and MKTCAP data.  
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TABLE 6 
Likelihood of an SEC Enforcement Action following a Restatement  
(Pre- and Post-SOX Periods) 
 
SEC ENFORCEMENT = α + β1-7[Corporate Transparency Pre- and Post-SOX] + β8-12[Restatement Severity] + 
β13-16[Restatement Characteristics] + β17-19[Firm Characteristics] + β20-23[Other Controls] + ε 
     
 Logistic Regression with Dependent Variable = SEC ENFORCEMENT 
Variablea Predict 
(1) 
Pre-SOX 
(1997-2002) 
(2) 
Post-SOX  
(2003-2005) 
(3) 
With 
Interactions 
Intercept  -7.293 -5.053 -6.888 
  (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
Corporate Transparency     
INVESTIGATION ? 1.178 1.687 1.301 
  (0.023) (<0.001) (0.008) 
PROMINENCE ( + ) 0.609 0.296 0.679 
  (0.029) (0.198) (0.013) 
SEC DISCLOSURE INDEX ? 0.330 -0.368§ 0.300 
  (0.043) (0.040) (0.051) 
POST-SOX ?   1.542 
    (0.251) 
INVESTIGATION*POST-SOX ?   0.250 
    (0.671) 
PROMINENCE* POST-SOX ?   -0.278 
    (0.547) 
SEC DISCLOSURE*POST-SOX ?   -0.701 
    (0.003) 
Restatement Severity     
RESTATEMENT MAGNITUDE ( - )b 8.164 7.092 7.375 
  (0.191) (0.296) (0.163) 
CONCURRENT RETURN (-1,+1) ( - ) -2.293 -3.596 -2.642 
  (0.040) (0.036) (0.007) 
FRAUD/IRREG ( + ) 0.182 -0.289 -0.088 
  (0.389) (0.342) (0.426) 
DAMAGES ( + ) 0.701 1.124 0.979 
  (0.071) (0.003) (<0.001) 
MISSTATEMENT LENGTH ( + ) 0.001 0.001 0.001 
  (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
Restatement Characteristics     
REVENUE ( + ) 1.346 1.417 1.314 
  (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
LEASE ( - ) 0.092 -0.953 -1.114 
  (0.473) (0.129) (0.057) 
RULE CHANGE  ( - ) -1.724 -0.364 -1.233 
  (0.008) (0.301) (0.008) 
COUNT ( + ) 0.348 0.024 0.117 
  (0.133) (0.470) (0.291) 
Firm Characteristics     
MKTCAP ? 0.046 -0.035 0.006 
  (0.744) (0.809) (0.949) 
FINANCIAL ? -0.952 1.032§ 0.236 
  (0.138) (0.027) (0.501) 
TECH ? -0.321 0.733† 0.114 
  (0.421) (0.108) (0.692) 
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 6 (continued) 
  
Variablea Predict 
(1) 
Pre-SOX 
(1997-2002) 
(2) 
Post-SOX  
(2003-2005) 
(3) 
With 
Interactions 
Other Controls     
PRIOR RETURNS (-252,-2) ( - ) -0.611 -0.532 -0.578 
  (0.006) (0.063) (0.001) 
POST RETURNS (+2,+20) ? 1.211 0.057 0.910 
  (0.102) (0.969) (0.150) 
SHARE TURNOVER ? 1.363 0.497 0.956 
  (0.075) (0.544) (0.075) 
DISCLOSE INTERVAL ( + ) 0.000 0.002‡ 0.001 
  (0.472) (0.006) (0.034) 
     
Joint Tests    Chi-square 
Investigation + Investigation*Post-SOX  19.37 
Prominence + Prominence*Post-SOX  1.36 
SEC Disclosure Index + SEC Disclosure*Post-SOX  5.28 
     
n  471c 767c 1238c 
Pseudo R2  22.19% 13.56% 16.91% 
-2 log likelihood  374.37 369.71 760.96 
Model chi-square  118.17 111.75 229.36 
p-value  <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Correctly Classified  87.0 89.5 88.0 
     
P-values are in parentheses under the logistic regression coefficients.  Two-tailed tests are shown for variables without a signed 
prediction; one-tailed tests are shown for variables with a signed prediction.  
 
§, ‡, and † indicate the coefficients in the pre- and post-SOX periods are significantly different at the p = 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 
levels, respectively. 
 
a See Appendix A for variable definitions.  
 
b A negative (positive) sign on RESTATEMENT MAGNITUDE would indicate that restatements resulting in more negative 
adjustments to earnings increase (decrease) the likelihood of an SEC sanction.  
 
c 11 firms were excluded from the regression due to missing POST RETURN and MKTCAP data (this corresponds to 8 and 3 
observations for the pre- and post-SOX models, respectively).  
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TABLE 7 
Likelihood of SEC Enforcement Actions with Inverse Mills Ratio 
 
SEC ENFORCEMENT = α + β1HIGH TRANSPARENCY + β2-6[Restatement Severity] + β7-10[Restatement 
Characteristics] + β11-13[Firm Characteristics] + β14-18[Other Controls] + β19Inverse Mills Ratio + ε 
       
 Logistic Regression with Dependent Variable = SEC ENFORCEMENT 
Variablea Predict All Years 
Pre-SOX  
(1997-2002) 
Post-SOX  
(2003-2005) 
Intercept  -3.372 -4.907 -5.022 
  (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) 
Corporate Transparency     
HIGH TRANSPARENCY ? 0.844 0.967 0.579 
  (0.022) (0.027) (0.438) 
Restatement Severity     
RESTATEMENT MAGNITUDE ( - ) 6.971 10.384 4.379 
  (0.180) (0.155) (0.364) 
CONCURRENT RETURN (-1,+1) ( - ) -2.734 -2.663 -3.919 
  (0.008) (0.029) (0.028) 
FRAUD/IRREG ( + ) 0.112 0.223 0.530 
  (0.413) (0.366) (0.215) 
DAMAGES ( + ) 1.052 0.296 1.496 
  (<0.001) (0.357) (<0.001) 
MISSTATEMENT LENGTH ( + ) 0.001 0.001 0.001 
  (<0.001) (0.006) (0.011) 
Restatement Characteristics     
REVENUE ( + ) 1.481 1.434 1.503 
  (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
LEASE ( - ) -1.566 -0.390 -1.184 
  (0.012) (0.399) (0.079) 
RULE CHANGE  ( - ) -1.078 -1.607 -0.444 
  (0.051) (0.134) (0.258) 
COUNT ( + ) 0.056 0.170 0.080 
  (0.399) (0.343) (0.397) 
Firm Characteristics     
MKTCAP ? -0.033 0.134 -0.150 
  (0.753) (0.530) (0.311) 
FINANCIAL ? 0.171 -1.011 1.076§ 
  (0.640) (0.156) (0.020) 
TECH ? -0.041 -0.457 0.589 
  (0.896) (0.311) (0.285) 
Other Controls     
POST-SOX ? -2.031 n/a n/a 
  (<0.001)   
PRIOR RETURNS (-252,-2) ( - ) -0.384 -0.402 -0.517 
  (0.044) (0.139) (0.088) 
POST RETURNS (+2,+20) ? 1.178 1.940 -0.551 
  (0.091) (0.031) (0.719) 
SHARE TURNOVER ? 1.023 1.400 0.898 
  (0.064) (0.088) (0.292) 
DISCLOSE INTERVAL ( + ) 0.002 0.002 0.002 
  (0.010) (0.243) (0.032) 
INVERSE MILLS RATIO ? -2.391 -1.793 -1.757 
  (0.109) (0.470) (0.591) 
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 7 (continued) 
     
  
All Years 
Pre-SOX  
(1997-2002) 
Post-SOX  
(2003-2005) 
     
n  1163b 416b 747b 
Pseudo R2  14.74% 21.17% 11.56% 
-2 log likelihood  691.27 321.17 356.35 
Model chi-square  185.45 98.97 91.77 
p-value  <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Correctly Classified  86.5 86.2 88.1 
     
The p-values are in parentheses under the logistic regression coefficients.  Two-tailed tests are shown for variables without a 
signed prediction; one-tailed tests are shown for variables with a signed prediction.  
 
§, ‡, and † indicate the coefficients in the pre- and post-SOX periods are significantly different at the p = 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 
levels, respectively. 
 
a See Appendix A for variable definitions.  
 
b 11 firms were excluded from the regression due to missing POST RETURN and MKTCAP data (8 and 3 missing observations 
respectively in the pre- and post-SOX models).  An additional 75 observations are excluding due to missing institutional 
ownership data, which is used as one of the instrumental variables in the first stage regression (55 and 20 missing observations 
respectively in the pre- and post-SOX models).   
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TABLE 8 
Class Action Lawsuits as an Additional Measure of Severity 
 
Panel A: Overlap of SEC Enforcement Actions and Class Action Lawsuits 
    
 Class Action Lawsuit  No Class Action Lawsuit Total 
SEC Enforcement Action 57 62 119 
No SEC Enforcement Action 92 1038 1130 
Total 149 1100 1249 
    
% of Obs. with SEC Action 38.3% 5.6% 9.5% 
    
 
 
Panel B: Multivariate Analysis 
 
SEC ENFORCEMENT = α + β1LITIGATION + β2-4[Corporate Transparency] + β5-9[Restatement Severity] + β10-
13[Restatement Characteristics] + β14-16[Firm Characteristics] + β17-21[Other Controls] + ε 
       
 Logistic Regression with Dependent Variable = SEC ENFORCEMENT 
Variablea Predict Coefficient P-valueb Odds Ratio 
Intercept  -5.341 (<0.001)  
     
LITIGATION ? 1.505 (<0.001) 4.503 
     
Corporate Transparency     
INVESTIGATION ? 1.291 (<0.001) 3.636 
PROMINENCE ( + ) 0.499 (0.015) 1.647 
SEC DISCLOSURE INDEX ? -0.019 (0.880) 0.982 
     
Restatement Severity     
RESTATEMENT MAGNITUDE ( - ) 6.145 (0.209) 466.486 
CONCURRENT RETURN (-1,+1) ( - ) -0.749 (0.249) 0.473 
FRAUD/IRREG ( + ) -0.332 (0.254) 0.717 
DAMAGES ( + ) 1.087 (<0.001) 2.965 
MISSTATEMENT LENGTH ( + ) 0.001 (<0.001) 1.001 
     
Restatement Characteristics     
REVENUE ( + ) 1.265 (<0.001) 3.543 
LEASE ( - ) -1.132 (0.059) 0.322 
RULE CHANGE  ( - ) -1.224 (0.006) 0.294 
COUNT ( + ) 0.131 (0.268) 1.140 
     
Firm Characteristics     
MKTCAP ? -0.043 (0.665) 0.958 
FINANCIAL ? 0.217 (0.552) 1.242 
TECH ? 0.032 (0.913) 1.033 
     
Other Controls     
POST-SOX ? -1.268 (<0.001) 0.281 
PRIOR RETURNS (-252,-2) ( - ) -0.463 (0.009) 0.629 
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 8 (continued) 
     
Variablea Predict Coefficient P-valueb Odds Ratio 
POST RETURNS (+2,+20) ? 1.100 (0.086) 3.004 
SHARE TURNOVER ? 0.480 (0.386) 1.616 
DISCLOSE INTERVAL ( + ) 0.001 (0.006) 1.001 
     
n  1238c   
Pseudo R2  18.2%   
-2 log likelihood  760.96   
Model chi-square  248.42   
p-value  <0.001   
Correctly Classified  89.5   
     
a See Appendix A for variable definitions.  
 
b Two-tailed tests are shown for variables without a signed prediction; one-tailed tests are shown for variables with a signed 
prediction.  
 
c 11 firms were excluded from the regression due to missing POST RETURN and MKTCAP data. 
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TABLE 9 
Monetary Penalties after an SEC Enforcement Action 
 
 
Panel A: Monetary Penalties per Restatement ($000)a  
 Full Sample Pre-SOX Post-SOX 
Individuals    
N 108 66 42 
Mean $4,241 $1,675 $8,274 
Median $156 $118 $284 
Min $0 $0 $0 
Max $75,204 $24,598 $75,204 
    
Firms    
N 101 57 44 
Mean $37,308 $30,062 $46,695 
Median $0 $0 $8,750 
Min $0 $0 $0 
Max $548,000 $548,000 $548,000 
 
Panel B: Average Monetary Penalties per Restatement by Corporate Transparency Measures ($000) 
 Independent Investigation Prominence SEC Disclosure Index 
 Yes No  Diff. High  
Medium
/Low  Diff.  8-K 
 
Other  Diff. 
Individual $4,521 $4,107 $-414 $3,672 $5,290 $-1,618 $1,682 $7,102 $-5,420* 
Firm $15,466 $46,981 $-31,515* $42,086 $28,681 $13,405 $37,019 $37,653 $634 
          
Panel C: Determinants of Individual and Firm Monetary Penalties 
  
 OLS Regression; Control variable coefficients excluded 
Variableb Predict 
(1) 
Y = IND_PENALTY 
(2) 
Y = FIRM_PENALTY 
Intercept  -11.160 -102.390 
  (0.220) (0.306) 
Corporate Transparency    
INVESTIGATION ? -2.241 -92.359 
  (0.486) (0.023) 
PROMINENCE ? -0.886 -7.410 
  (0.734) (0.785) 
SEC DISCLOSURE INDEX ? -1.115 -3.420 
  (0.404) (0.810) 
POST-SOX ( + ) 19.184 -99.816 
  (0.061) (0.208) 
INVESTIGATION*POST-SOX ? 3.288 69.758 
  (0.445) (0.141) 
PROMINENCE* POST-SOX ? -1.895 24.530 
  (0.651) (0.557) 
SEC DISCLOSURE*POST-SOX ? -3.407 6.084 
  (0.096) (0.766) 
    
   
   
   
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 9 (continued) 
   
Joint Tests F-value F-value 
Investigation + Investigation*Post-SOX 0.11 0.54 
Prominence + Prominence*Post-SOX 0.77 0.29 
SEC Disclosure Index + SEC Disclosure*Post-SOX              8.68 0.03 
    
n  106c 99c 
Adjusted R2  56.52% 32.93% 
    
*, **, and *** indicate the average monetary penalties differ between groups at the p = 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. P-
values are in parentheses under the logistic regression coefficients.  Two-tailed tests are shown for variables without a signed 
prediction; one-tailed tests are shown for variables with a signed prediction.  
 
Control variables for shareholder harm, deep pockets, and enforcement complexity are included in Panel C, but the coefficients 
are untabulated. Panel C, Column 1, includes restatements leading to one or more enforcement actions against individuals.  If 
more than one individual is sanctioned for a given restatement, the penalties are summed across all individuals.  Panel C, Column 
2, includes restatements leading to one or more enforcement actions against the restatement firm.   
 
a Both firm and individual monetary penalties are winsorized at the 99th percentile to limit the influence of outliers.  Before 
winsorization, the maximum individual penalty is $110,492 and the maximum firm penalty is $605,800 (in $000’s).   
 
b See Appendix A for variable definitions.  
 
c Two observations are excluded from each model due to missing RESTATEMENT MAGNITUDE data. 
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